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CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS: TOWARD AN
EXPANSIVE EQUALITY APPROACH TO THE
DOCTRINE OF GOOD FAITH IN
CONTRACT LAW
Emily M.S. Houht
This Article argues that courts should use the doctrine of good faith in
contract law to prohibit improper considerations of race in contract formation
and performance, and should recognize good faith as a device for eliminat-
ing racial subordination that can function beyond the scope of conventional
civil rights discourse. Although civil rights laws provide important remedies
to victims of discrimination, the elimination of racial subordination cannot
remain the exclusive domain of civil rights law. Rather, other substantive
areas of law can and should incorporate expansive equality principles to
achieve that end. For example, this Article demonstrates how the implied
obligation of good faith in contract law, applied in the at-will employment
context, can employ expansive equality principles to provide alternate reme-
dies to at-will employees who may not be able to obtain civil rights remedies
because of the onerous burdens they must satisfy in order to prevail on their
civil rights claims. Although courts have used the good faith doctrine largely
to achieve economically efficient outcomes, this Article further argues that
courts need not limit the doctrine's use in that way. By screening the doctrine
of good faith through the lenses of critical race and law and market economy
theories, this Article argues that using the doctrine of good faith to prohibit
improper considerations of race in contracting is consistent not only with the
equitable principles embodied by the doctrine, but also with the contractual
goals of protecting parties' bargains, wealth formation, and the facilitation
of exchange transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article interrogates a controversial issue: should contractual
claims for breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair deal-
ing in at-will employment contracts be available to plaintiffs if the
breach is based on allegedly improper racial prejudice?1 The varied
I Although the scope of this Article is limited to theorizing a definition of good faith
that would preclude the improper consideration of race in the context of the contractual
employment relationship, its thesis may be applied more widely to improper consideration
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and inconsistent judicial responses to this question have spawned sev-
eral articles. 2 This Article's response focuses on how the contractual
doctrine of good faith is used in at-will employment cases. Specifi-
cally, the Article incorporates a critical race critique of the ways in
which the availability of conventional, statutory civil rights remedies
have, in many jurisdictions, precluded at-will employees from assert-
ing contractual good faith claims against their former employers
whose conduct was racially motivated. The Article concludes that the
use of racial prejudice in the contracting process should provide a
good faith cause of action for at-will employees. This conclusion is
reached by synthesizing law and market economy theory and critical
race theory, and applying the product of that synthesis to several such
at-will and good faith cases.
The first problem addressed in this Article is the way in which the
current interpretation of the doctrine of good faith is used to pre-
clude suit in many valid contexts. For example, an employer might
terminate a competent, Black, female, at-will employee based on racist
assumptions or evaluations of her performance, because the employer
has failed to provide her with adequate mentoring and access to insti-
tutional information relative to her White and/or male co-workers.
This action clearly violates the plain meaning of the term "good faith."
Courts nevertheless are split over whether an employer's discrimina-
tion provides the at-will employee with a common law cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith if the employee may
pursue civil rights remedies by suing under state or federal antidis-
crimination statutes.
3
The refusal to allow such a contractual claim is justified by the law
and economics approach to good faith, which this Article argues has
subsumed the broader good faith approach known as the "excluder
analysis."4 The excluder analysis approach, conceptualized by Robert
in the contracting process of, for example, national origin, ethnicity, gender, sexual orien-
tation, age, and disability.
2 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and
a State Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 431 (1990) (arguing that Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (which then
prohibited the consideration of race in the making and enforcement of contracts) did not
reach the performance of contracts, was wrongly decided, and advocating the use of state
contract law to address racial discrimination in contract performance); Neil G. Williams,
Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial
Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 183, 184 (1994) (arguing that
"contract law's prohibition of racial discrimination in the formation, performance, en-
forcement, or termination of a contract would be perfectly consistent with its natural, or-
derly evolution in [the twentieth century]").
3 See infra Parts IV.B-V.
4 See infra Part I.
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Summers5 and adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,' defines
good faith conduct as the opposite of bad faith conduct in the process
of contract formation. 7 Thus, for example, because courts define the
withholding of relevant information in the contracting process as bad
faith, a contracting party must disclose all such information in order
to satisfy the implied obligation of good faith.8 Refusing to act in
good faith because of racism, however, is not defined as bad faith per
se. Rather, the bad act itself must be purely contractual in nature
(e.g., a party withholds necessary information because of his or her
racism).9 Racism in contracting is thus viewed as a mere bad motive,
rather than as a form of contractual bad faith itself.
The Article addresses this problem by suggesting an alteration of
the doctrine of good faith based on a law and market economy ap-
proach, rather than a law and economics or excluder approach. The
law and market economy approach challenges the law and economics
assumption that individuals can weigh the costs and benefits of actions
in an objective manner, unimpacted by cultural influences.' 0 Under
law and market economy theory, individuals' cultural biases (such as
racism or sexism) affect how they define, interpret, and weigh the
costs and benefits of their actions." This theory reveals that the ex-
cluder approach to good faith, as it has been appropriated by the law
and economics movement, makes an untenable distinction between
general cultural biases on the one hand, and acts specifically related
to contract formation with the attendant benefits and obligations that
derive therefrom on the other.
The second and related problem addressed in this Article is that
the excluder analysis approach leads courts to abandon victims of ra-
5 See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 199-207 (1968) [hereinafter Summers,
Good Faith]; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptu-
alization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818-21, 825-30 (1982) [hereinafter Summers, General
Duty].
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981); see also infra Part
l.A.2 (discussing the excluder analysis approach to good faith and its subsequent adoption
by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
7 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 196 (" [G] ood faith ... is best understood
as an 'excluder'-it is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but
which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith." (footnote omitted)).
8 See id. at 203.
9 See infra Parts 1, 1V.
10 For a discussion of law and market economy theory, see infra Part I. Robin Paul
Malloy developed the conceptual framework of law and market economy theory. See ROBIN
PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES OF LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS (2000).
1 1 See MALLOY, supra note 10, at 6; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of
Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998) (applying economist Elizabeth Anderson's reconception of "ra-
tional choice" to effect a consciously feminist economic approach to contract law).
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cist contracting to conventional civil rights laws. The procedural diffi-
culties inherent in civil rights law, however, often leave the at-will
employee who has been subjected to racism in the contractual process
without a remedy. 12 Hence, the excluder analysis approach to good
faith combines with the procedural barriers in civil rights law to pre-
clude many valid claims. The Article addresses this second problem
by way of a critical race critique that demonstrates the inappropriate-
ness of abandoning at-will employees to the remedies of civil rights
law. This critique in essence states that conventional civil rights law,
which may provide redress for the most egregious racist offenses in
the workplace, not only does not provide such redress for, but also has
legitimized, less onerous but more pervasive forms of racism in the
workplace. I
On the basis of the forgoing critiques, this Article proposes the
addition of another formulation of the doctrine of good faith, one
that explicitly comports with substantive and expansive notions of
equality. 14 The application of this formulation would provide wrongly
terminated at-will employees a contractual basis for relief based on the
implied obligation of good faith in cases in which civil rights remedies
are out of reach.
15
In order to demonstrate the need for a reformulation of the doc-
trine of good faith, Part I.A of this Article provides a basic primer on
12 See infra note 211 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A (discussing critical
legal and critical race studies challenges to the notion that the law is or can be applied
objectively).
13 See infra Part III.B.
14 See infra Part lII.A.2 (discussing Kimberl Crenshaw's notion of an "expansive" ap-
proach to the goals of antidiscrimination law); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX
EQUALITY 2-43 (2001) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY] (providing a feminist cri-
tique of formal equality in the context of sex discrimination law); CATHARINE A. MACKIN-
NON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON,
FEMINIST THEORY] (same).
My conception of "equality," a term used throughout this Article, might be analogized
to Iris Marion Young's conception of justice. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLIT-
ICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990). In this influential work, Young critiques modern, liberal, distrib-
utive theories of justice as reductionist in their "tendency to reduce political subjects to a
unity and to value commonness or sameness over specificity and difference," id. at 3, and
argues instead that "[o]ppression and domination ... should be the primary terms for
conceptualizing injustice," id. at 9. Young further asserts:
[The distributive paradigm] tends to focus thinking about social justice on
the allocation of material goods such as things, resources, income, and
wealth, or on the distribution of social positions, especiallyjobs. This focus
tends to ignore the social structure and institutional context that often help
determine distributive patterns. Of particular importance ... are issues of
decision-making power and procedures, division of labor, and culture.
Id. at 15. Responding to those identified problems, Young defines injustice as being com-
prised of the systemic, social conditions of "oppression, the institutional constraint on self-
development, and domination, the institutional constraint on self-determination." Id. at 37
(emphasis added).
15 See infra Part V.
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the contractually based implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing and the scholarly controversy surrounding the articulation and
formulation of a workable good faith standard. Using case law, Part
I.B demonstrates that, despite the controversy and the concededly
amorphous state of the law surrounding the good faith standard, the
courts' formulations are by and large based on an economic analysis
of the doctrine of good faith and contract law. This case law analysis
begins to critique the current economic formulations of the good
faith standard and, in particular, the way in which those economic
formulations leave no room for consideration of how the ideology of
racial subordination may corrupt the contracting process and cause
subsequent harm to non-breaching parties.
Part II of this Article extends the critique of the economic formu-
lation of the doctrine of good faith by explaining and applying Profes-
sor Robin Paul Malloy's law and market economy theory, in particular
because Malloy's "reinterpretation" of law and economics is effected
on economic terms.1 6 Focusing further on the semiotic nature of Mal-
loy's law and market economy theory, this Article becomes a necessary
screen, in addition to the screen of law and economics, through which
to analyze contractual good faith claims and cases.
Part III adds another theoretical screen to the critique and analy-
sis by setting forth the foundational concepts of critical race theory
that guide the descriptive and normative aspects of this project. Part
III.A focuses on two key concepts. First, it examines the perpetrator-
victim critique of conventional antidiscrimination discourse, as articu-
lated by critical legal scholar Alan David Freeman and critical race
scholar Charles R. Lawrence III. This critique states that civil rights
law legitimatized everyday forms of unconscious and subconscious ra-
cism through its procedural mechanisms, which are wrongly and al-
most singularly concerned with the intent and perspective of the
alleged perpetrators of discrimination.' 7 Part III.A also discusses
Kimberl Crenshaw's critique of traditional civil rights discourse as
16 See MALLOY, supra note 10, at 1-22 (describing the methodology of law and market
economy theory and contrasting it with traditional law and economics scholarship).
17 With respect to the word "discrimination," which this Article tries to avoid in set-
ting out the normative aspects of this project, Catharine MacKinnon has stated in the
context of her critique of formal equality:
Fundamentally, the law has often failed to call the problem of discrimina-
tion by a real name-say, white supremacy or male dominance. It has in-
stead used more neutral terms like "racism" or "racial classifications" or
"race," or "sexism" or "sex classifications" or "sex," terms that fail to specify
who is doing what to whom. As a result, while many conditions of actual
disadvantage are obscured, situations in which the affected and agentic
groups appear reversed can easily be made to look like discrimination. Ab-
stractions (are you treated the same or differently?) may be inverted far
more readily than substance (are you victimized by white supremacy or
male dominance or both?).
1030 [Vol. 88:1025
CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS
embodying a restrictive view of the goal of antidiscrimination law that
seeks to prevent discrete and egregious acts of race-based wrongdo-
ing, rather than eliminate the pervasive ideological and material con-
ditions of racial subordination. Crenshaw further proposes that legal
decision makers recognize and apply a more expansive view of antidis-
criminatory goals, a view which would be concerned primarily with the
elimination of the ideological and material components of racial sub-
ordination and White supremacy.
By presenting a general critical race critique of law and econom-
ics, Part III.B sets the stage for this Article's critique of the economic
approach to the doctrine of good faith and, using Crenshaw's phrase-
ology, its proposal of an "expansive equality" approach to good faith.
Part III.B also argues that Malloy's law and market economy theory
plays a crucial role in developing that critique, because it directly con-
fronts law and economics theory in a manner that also recognizes the
complex and multiplistic realities of market actors, whose actions are
dictated by their individual identities as well as by their membership
in broader communities.
Part IV further synthesizes critical race theory and law and market
economy theory to formulate the "expansive equality" approach to the
doctrine of good faith. It does so by analyzing a specific body of good
faith cases in the at-will employment context, because that limited
body of law best demonstrates the inadequacy of civil rights remedies
for victims of racial discrimination in the workplace. Part IV's analysis
of that body of law illustrates how the contractual obligation of good
faith may be used to provide redress in cases in which antidiscrimina-
tion law precludes civil rights redress. More theoretically and impor-
tantly, the case law analysis demonstrates why the doctrine of good
faith and contract law should provide redress for victims of racial sub-
ordination. In analyzing the cases from a fused critical race and law
and market economy perspective, Part IV also argues that expansive
and substantive equality and Malloy's market theoryjustify a reconcep-
tualization of good faith, one that recognizes that a benefit flowing
from every contractual relationship is freedom from racial subordina-
tion through the contracting process.
In arriving at this reconception, Part IV.A reviews the erosion of
the at-will employment doctrine, which permits an employer or em-
ployee to terminate his or her employment relationship at any time
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 14, at 21. Although this Article continues to use
terms such as "racism" and "sexism," MacKinnon's concerns with the use of those "neutral"
terms are well noted. This Article's use of those terms suggests that "racism" connotes
continuing practices of white supremacy and racial subordination and that "sexism" con-
notes continuing practices of male dominance and sexual subordination in almost all as-
pects of American life and culture.
2003] 1031
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for no reason, after proper notice. This erosion, initiated primarily to
protect employees from unjust termination, has emerged through the
judicial and legislative creation of several exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine, one of which is the good faith exception.
Part IV.B discusses how, notwithstanding the exceptions to the
doctrine of at-will employment, courts have failed to render a consid-
ered and consistent treatment of cases in which at-will employees have
attempted to bring both contractual and tortious good faith claims
based on facts that also allegedly give rise to statutory discrimination
claims. Part IV.B critiques the courts' conclusions from a critical race
perspective, arguing that they are the result of an unwarranted over-
reliance on conventional civil rights law to remedy currently cogniza-
ble forms of racial discrimination.
A review of the case law begins in Part IV.B.1, which discusses the
majority and minority positions on the "alternate remedies doctrine,"
under which state common law claims for breach of good faith based
on allegedly discriminatory conduct are precluded by statutory an-
tidiscrimination schemes. This section argues that the minority posi-
tion, which rejects the alternate remedies doctrine, is the better
position. Part IV.B.2 focuses further on cases in which courts have
taken the minority position. In those cases, at-will plaintiffs success-
fully brought discrimination claims and tort claims for breach of good
faith or wrongful discharge. Part IV.B.2 argues that those cases should
be analogized to cases in which plaintiffs attempt to bring state com-
mon law claims for breach of the contractual implied obligation of
good faith, and that such contractual claims should be permitted, de-
spite existing case law to the contrary. Part IV.B.3 examines cases in
which the courts have rejected contractual good faith claims in the at-
will context because of the availability of statutory antidiscrimination
remedies. This section offers a critical race and law and market econ-
omy critique of the courts' holdings in those cases, and argues for a
fusion of the public policy and good faith exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine.
Part V puts this expansive-equality good-faith exception into play.
It argues that an expansive equality approach to the doctrine of con-
tractual good faith should enable contractual good faith claims not-
withstanding the availability of civil rights remedies based on the same
factual allegations. Part V describes how such good faith claims might
be brought and analyzed in real life cases by discussing and analogiz-
ing Schuster v. Derocili,18 a recent case in which the Delaware Supreme
Court sustained the plaintiffs contractual good faith claim, which was
based on sexually harassing conduct in the workplace, despite and be-
18 775 A.2d 1029 (Del. 2001).
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cause of the limited availability of statutory civil rights remedies for
such sexual subordination. Part V argues that the court's analysis in
the Schuster decision is grounded in a profound understanding of the
mechanisms and conditions of male domination, and that it should be
analogized to race cases. Because the Schuster court's analysis actual-
izes this Article's proposed expansive equality approach to the doc-
trine of contractual good faith, Part V argues that it is the model by
which courts should analyze and adjudicate contractual good faith
claims rooted in allegations that might also give rise to antidiscrimina-
tion claims.
I
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A. A Primer: The Standards
The implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing' 9 has been
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,2" is implied into every
contract governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,21 and in most
jurisdictions is implied into every contract at common law.22 There-
fore, it is the ideal vehicle through which to introduce and incorpo-
rate the goals of "expansive equality" into contract law. This is so
because, although the concept of good faith is relatively easy to grasp,
the actual standard by which good faith or its absence is discerned can
be frustratingly elusive. A sophisticated and lively discussion of what
constitutes good faith, whether among students or scholars, reflects
not only how the meaning of good faith might fluctuate with the times
and the context of the transaction, but also how the meaning of the
common law invariably shifts as the courts reconstitute and reinter-
19 Although the implied obligation of good faith is often referred to as the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing, this Article will subsequently refer to the implied obligation
simply as that of good faith. Regarding the term "good faith and fair dealing," the distin-
guished Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, currently the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, has stated: "'Good faith' has also been used in other connections. It has tradi-
tionally been used to set the standard of honesty for good faith purchase, rather than for
performance. Coupling it with the term fair dealing may help to make it more descriptive
of performance." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 504 n.3 (3d ed. 1999).
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").
21 U.C.C. § 1-304 (West Supp. 2002) ("Every contract or duty within [the Uniform
Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforce-
ment."); U.C.C. § 1-201 (b) (20) (West Supp. 2002) (defining good faith generally as "hon-
esty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing").
22 See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 app. (1980) (citing cases from jurisdictions that expressly im-
pose an implied duty of good faith in the performance of all contracts); Thomas A. Dia-
mond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards far Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and




pret the law.23 Even classroom discussions about good faith during
the first year of law school highlight the general tension in the law
between equity and justice on the one hand, and some amount of
pragmatic certainty delineated by legal rules on the other.
Many scholars, with different goals in mind, have attempted to
formulate a workable good faith standard. For example, various
scholars have proposed a standard that gives contracting parties a
measure of predictability that enables them to behave accordingly,
and which permits courts and juries to make principled rather than
intuitive judgments about good faith conduct.24 However, two ap-
proaches continue to guide ongoing efforts toward formulating a
workable standard for the doctrine of good faith: Robert Summers's
"excluder analysis" and Steven Burton's "forgone opportunities"
approach .25
1. The "Forgone Opportunities" Approach
The "forgone opportunities" approach, first theorized by Burton,
is essentially an economic analysis of the doctrine of good faith. The
analysis begins with an economic inquiry into the cost perspective on
contractual breach. Burton suggests that, from an economic perspec-
tive, bad faith breach is analytically similar to simple breach by failure
to perform an express promise, in that both involve a party's attempt
to recapture opportunities forgone in the contracting process (in the
form of resources committed at the time of contracting to particular
uses in the future). 26 Further, one of Burton's basic premises is that,
because contracts often involve some "discretion in performance" on
the part of the contracting parties, a "weaker" party at the mercy of
this discretion in performance might require some protection against
a "stronger" party. 27 The duty of good faith performance supplies this
23 As Justice Holmes wrote, the law "will become entirely consistent only when it
ceases to grow." O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1881).
24 See, e.g., Burton, supra note 22, at 378-94 (proposing the "forgone opportunities"
approach to good faith); Diamond & Foss, supra note 22, at 600-24 (proposing two cate-
gorical standards for assessing good faith claims: commercial unreasonableness and
dishonesty).
25 Legal scholars and commentators continue to theorize about the most desirable
and useable articulation of the good faith standard. Indeed, more than one hundred law
review and bar journal articles have been written about the implied duty of good faith in
the past twenty years alone. Many of those articles, however, focus on good faith in particu-
larized contexts, such as insurance, contracting, and labor. For purposes of this Article, I
focus on Burton's and Summers's approaches, because other formulations of the duty of
good faith may be subsumed within them.
26 See Burton, supra note 22, at 373-78.
27 See id, at 380-84. This discretion arises, for example, if the decision regarding cer-
tain terms of performance is delayed and decisionmaking authority is assigned to one of
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protection, and therefore its application in a given set of circum-
stances depends on the legitimacy of the exercise of that discretion.
28
Burton's analysis also criticizes the "reasonable contemplation"
method of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of discre-
tion.29 According to the reasonable contemplation approach, the
duty of good faith performance permits parties to exercise their dis-
cretion "for any purpose . . . reasonably within the contemplation of
the parties."30 Therefore, bad faith conduct includes any exercise of
discretion beyond the range of the parties' reasonable contemplation.
Burton criticizes this approach as too reliant on "an amorphous total-
ity of the circumstances at the time of formation, '31 and disapproves
of the open-ended and far-reaching factual inquiry it potentially re-
quires to discern the parties' intentions and reasonable
expectations. 
3 2
Burton thus formulates his forgone opportunities approach in or-
der to "make[ ] it possible to identify with greater particularity the
relevant expectations and motives that have been held to constitute
bad faith." 33 The forgone opportunities approach assumes that dur-
ing the contract formation process, contracting parties forgo opportu-
nities to enter into other agreements. 34 Burton describes bad faith
conduct as the exercise of contractual discretion on the part of one
party in an attempt to "recapture" those opportunities forgone during
contract formation, because parties to the resulting contract should
have known that the contract precluded the subsequent recapture of
those opportunities.35 Burton argues that the application of this for-
gone opportunities approach is desirable because it enables courts to
employ a less amorphous and more factually particularized inquiry in
their assessment of whether a party has breached the implied obliga-
tion of good faith in a given case.36
2. The "Excluder Analysis" Approach
Summers rendered one of the most important critiques of Bur-
ton's forgone opportunities approach in 1982, and in so doing, built
the parties, or if terms in the contract are unclear, ambiguous, or simply omitted. Id. at
380.
28 See id. at 382-83.
29 Id. at 387.
30 Id. at 385-86 (footnotes omitted).
31 Id. at 387.
32 Id.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 388 ("[Elach party must forgo some future opportunity upon formation
and thus restrain its future freedom in some way.").
35 See id. at 388-89.
36 Id. at 390-92; see supra text accompanying note 32.
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upon his earlier influential work on the doctrine of good faith. 37 Cen-
tral to Summers's theory of good faith, first articulated in 1968, is the
notion that good faith is defined as the negative corollary of bad
faith. 38 Accordingly, good faith performance cannot be reduced to a
certain and specific set of appropriate and acceptable behaviors;
rather, good faith derives its meaning by "rul[ing] out radically heter-
ogeneous forms of bad faith."'
Based on this general normative principle, Summers critiques
Burton's forgone opportunities approach to good faith, arguing that
good faith should not and cannot be defined in purely economic
terms. 411 Summers further posits that good faith can be described only
through the exclusion of contextually recognizable forms of bad faith
conduct in the performance of a given contract.4 1 He promotes, in
deliberate and direct opposition to Burton, a more open-ended ap-
proach to good faith "in the nature of a principle or maxim," as op-
posed to a "rule."42 Nonetheless, in his 1968 article, Summers also
acknowledges the need for some delimiting categorization of bad
faith conduct, and formulates an inclusive but nonexhaustive list of
eight such categories. 43
Summers's excluder approach to the doctrine of good faith re-
ceived explicit approval in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.44 In-
37 See Summers, General Duty, supra note 5, at 830-34. Summers's 1982 critique of the
forgone opportunities approach expanded upon his earlier work on good faith, in which
he first developed the excluder analysis. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5.
38 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 200-01.
39 Id. at 204.
40 See Summers, General Duty, supra note 5, at 826-27, 830-34. Summers's critique of
Burton's economic approach to good faith succinctly summarizes certain aspects of a more
general critique of law and economics. For example, Summers critiques the forgone op-
portunities approach as positively or descriptively "ahistoric," amoral in the sense that it
disregards the "moral" component of contractual obligations, and overly speculative in its
purported economic reasoning. See id. at 827.
41 See id. at 818-21.
42 See id. at 821 (describing the excluder conceptualization of good faith as encapsu-
lated in section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRAcrs § 205 cmt. a (1981) ("The phrase 'good faith' is used in a variety of con-
texts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context.... [I]t excludes a variety of types
of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' .... ).
43 See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 203. The eight categories of bad faith
(and their good faith opposites) are: concealment of defects in goods sold (full disclosure
of material facts); willful failure to perform in full when there has been substantial per-
formance (substantial performance without known material deviation from specifications);
coercive abuse of bargaining power to raise contract price (refraining from such abuse);
intentional frustration of another party's ability to perform contractual obligations (coop-
erative action); conscious failure to mitigate damages (mitigation of damages); arbitrary
and capricious exercise of power to terminate a contract (reasonable action); overreaching
interpretation of contract terms (fair and reasonable interpretation); and harassment to
obtain repeated assurances of performance (acceptance of adequate assurances). Id.
44 Although the Restatement adopted the excluder approach to good faith, the Uni-
form Commercial Code did not. See Summers, General Duty, supra note 5, at 824-25.
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deed, the comments to section 205 of the Restatement (Second) note
that:
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in per-
formance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified.
But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist
of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. A com-
plete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following
types are among those which have been recognized in judicial deci-
sions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and
slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a
power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate
in the other party's performance.
4 5
The comments to section 205 also appear to adopt Summers's articu-
lation of the primary rationales for the doctrine of good faith: "'jus-
tice and ...justice according to law.'''46 The Restatement (Second)
states:
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith perform-
ance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an
agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expecta-
tions of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct
characterized as involving "bad faith" because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.
47
Despite Summers's emphasis on justice, reflected in the Restate-
ment's language concerning "community standards of decency, fair-
ness or reasonableness," 4 this Article argues that Summers's excluder
analysis approach has been employed in practice primarily to bring
about economic efficiency.49 Although this Article does not argue
Rather, the Uniform Commercial Code defines good faith as "honesty in fact and the ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201(b) (20)
(West 2002).
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981) (emphasis added).
46 Summers, General Duty, supra note 5, at 826 (quoting Summers, Good Faith, supra
note 5, at 198). In fact, Summers notes that although the Restatement (Second) did not adopt
his specific formulation, "the overlap between the [Restatement's] language ... and my own
formulation is great." Id.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (emphasis added).
48 Id.
49 Economic efficiency is not necessarily inconsistent with justice. For example, in a
famous article, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed refute the notion that justice
concerns are merely residual in the economic analysis calculus, arguing that "many entitle-
ments that properly are described as based on justice in our society can easily be explained
in terms either of broad distributional preferences like equality or of efficiency or of both."
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1105 (1972); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.13 (5th ed. Aspen Publishers 1998) (providing an economic
justification of quasi-contractual restitutionary recovery for benefits conferred to preserve
life, health, or property).
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that efficiency of transactional exchange should not be a goal of con-
tract law, it contends that, in some cases, Summers's call for the pri-
macy ofjustice should be meaningfully revived. This "call" is different
from Summers's simply in that it posits that good faith should encom-
pass a specific conception of justice modeled on substantive equality
and Iris Marion Young's oppression/domination model of injustice.5°1
Before moving to a discussion of this Article's proposed model of
good faith in the at-will employment context, however, Part I.B dis-
cusses how the excluder analysis approach has been used to effect an
economic model of the doctrine of good faith.
B. The Dominance of the Economic Model
Although the forgone opportunities and excluder analysis ap-
proaches are philosophically and methodogically distinct, the applica-
tion of each in substance reflects an economic analysis of the doctrine
of good faith. Because of the impact and importance of market analy-
sis and economic analysis on the law generally, and because the con-
clusions and proposals set forth in subsequent sections of this Article
critique the entrenchment of economic analysis of the law from a criti-
cal race and law and market economy perspective, it is necessary to set
forth some basic principles of law and economics as a foundation for
further arguments about the two oppositional approaches to the for-
mulation of a good faith standard.
1. Law and Economics
Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law has significantly influ-
enced the development of law and economics scholarship. 51 Building
upon the foundational work of scholars such as Ronald Coase 52 and
Guido Calabresi, 53 Posner's seminal text laid the groundwork for the
50 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
51 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (1972).
52 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (discussing
what has come to be known as the "Coase theorem," which states that if transaction costs
are minimal, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources, regardless
of how the law assigns rights).
53 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (expanding economic analysis into tort law).
1038 [Vol. 88:1025
2003] CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS 1039
developing discourse 54 of law and economics 55 over the past thirty
years. In Economic Analysis of Law, Posner demonstrates the primacy of
efficiency, or the "allocation of resources in which value is maxi-
mized," 56 in the law. 57 Significantly, in the book's introductory mater-
ials, Posner carefully defines and differentiates between two models of
efficiency, one based on a concept of Pareto-superiority and the other
on the Kaldor-Hicks construction of efficiency as wealth maximiza-
tion.58 The Pareto-superior model describes an efficient transaction
or reallocation of resources as "one that makes at least one person
better off and no one worse off."'59 In contrast, the more elastic
Kaldor-Hicks model is
not concerned with whether or not a reallocation of resources will
make certain individuals worse off, but rather with whether or not
society's aggregate utility has been maximized. [A] reallocation of
resources is efficient if those who gain from it obtain enough to
fully compensate those who lose from it .... 60
Posner adopts the Kaldor-Hicks conception of efficiency, which he
also describes as "wealth maximization."
'61
Using this notion of wealth maximization as a foundation for his
theory of law and economics, Posner goes on to describe that theory
as having both positive and normative aspects. 62 In the positivist
sense, Posner's analysis can be used to describe many of the legal re-
sults and rules underlying our common law. That is, the common law
reaches efficient outcomes. 63 In the normative sense, Posner asserts
that legal decision makers should prefer legal rules that promote the
54 This Article uses the word "discourse" deliberately to imply that law and economics
constitutes a specific system of representation by which legal meaning and knowledge are
produced and reproduced. Moreover, this Article assumes that the reproduction of knowl-
edge through the discursive practice of law and economics by legal scholars, teachers, law-
yers, and judges is directly correlated to how power is configured, reconfigured, held, and
circulated in society at large. See Stuart Hall, The Work of Representation, in REPRESENTATION:
CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACrICES 13, 41-51 (Stuart Hall ed., 1997)
(discussing discourse and its relationship to knowledge, truth, and power in society).
55 In this age of post-law and economics, Posnerian economic analysis continues to
be regarded as foundational and is referred to as the Chicago School of Law and
Economics.
56 POSNER, supra note 49, § 1.2, at 13.
57 See, e.g., id. §§ 2.1-2.3.
58 See id. § 1.2, at 14-15.
59 Id. § 1.2, at 14. "In other words, the criterion of Pareto superiority is unanimity of
all affected persons." Id.
60 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY
AND PRACrICE 40 (1990).
61 POSNER, supra note 49, §1.2, at 14.
62 Id. § 2.2.
63 See id. Posner asserts that
many areas of the law. . . bear the stamp of economic reasoning.... What
we may call the efficiency theory of the common law is not that every com-
mon law doctrine and decision is efficient .... The theory is that the com-
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efficient allocation of resources. 64 Efficiency as wealth maximization
thus forms the bedrock of Posner's economic analysis of the law in
both its positive and normative aspects.
In one sense, economic analysis of contract law guides lawyering
and judicial decision making to produce conditions that approach a
state of efficient bargaining and to correct many of the market failures
that can occur in the contracting process.65 These goals are realized
by minimizing transaction costs. 66 In turn, if transaction costs are
minimized, individual contracting parties can achieve their goals, be-
cause perfectly efficient contracts would permit and require the strict
enforcement of all contractual obligations, without the need for judi-
cial gap-filling and regulation. 67 Although a perfect contracting envi-
ronment is impossible to obtain in the real world, the efficient
application of legal rules contributes to wealth formation and
maximization.
Although the preceding explanation is overgeneralized, further
theorizing of the economically ideal contracting environment is pre-
mised broadly on a few different conditions or assumptions. One con-
dition assumes that only rational decision makers can enter into
enforceable exchange transactions. 6  The individual rationality of a
given decision maker is determined by that party's ability to order his
or her preferences and, consequently, to maintain stable prefer-
ences. 69 Robin Paul Malloy notes that these rational actors "know
mon law is best (not perfectly) explained as a system for maximizing the
wealth of society.
Id. § 2.2, at 27.
64 See id. § 2.2.
65 See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1986). Owen Fiss
has stated:
The aim of th[e] .. .normative[ ] branch of law and economics is not to
describe or explain how decisions were in fact made or predict how they
will be made, but rather to guide them .... According to this branch of law
and economics, the normative concepts of the law should be construed and
applied in such a way as to make the judicial power an instrument for
perfecting the market.
Id.; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 205-12 (Addison Wesley
Longman, Inc. 3d ed. 2000) (discussing the concepts of perfect contracts and market
failure).
66 Transaction costs are "the costs of effecting a transfer of rights." POSNER, supra
note 49, § 3.1, at 39. More specifically, transaction costs are "[c]onditions impeding the
carrying out of mutually beneficial exchanges; such costs include information costs, costs
of negotiating and contracting, and costs imposed by taxes and regulations." MALLOY,
supra note 60, glossary at 163.
67 See COOTR & UL N, supra note 65, at 205-06; ROIERT CoorER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 230 (1988) [hereinafter COOTER & ULEN, 1988 LAW AND ECONOMICS].
68 See CoorER & ULEN, supra note 65, at 206-07; MALLOY, supra note 60, at 31-32.
69 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 65, at 206.
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what they want" and "can take clues from the market. ' 70 In pursuing
their stable preferences, however, rational decision makers may be
constrained by factors beyond their control, such as fraudulent or op-
portunistic manipulations by the other party to a contract.71 Thus,
from an economic perspective, one aspect of contract law that helps
to create a perfect contracting environment is its goal of deterring
people from "behaving opportunistically toward their contracting par-
ties, in order to encourage the optimal timing of economic activity
and ... obviate costly self-protective measures. "72
With respect to contract law in particular, Posner further argues
that the typical contract case is
a setting of low transaction costs, and therefore a judicial failure to
discover the efficient solution can be rectified for the future by a
drafting change. This point suggests that contract law cannot read-
ily be used to achieve goals other than efficiency. A ruling that fails
to interpolate the efficient term will not affect future conduct; it will
be reversed by the parties in their subsequent dealings. It will only
impose additional-and avoidable-transaction costs. 7 3
It is the suggestion that "contract law cannot readily be used to
achieve goals other than efficiency" that this Article disputes.
2. The Obvious Case: Forgone Opportunities
The "amorphous" nature of the duty of good faith, as described
by Burton,74 appears to exist in tension with basic principles of a con-
ventional economic analysis of the law. It is this tension that Burton
attempts to ease through the forgone opportunities approach to the
doctrine of good faith.75 In doing so, Burton not only deftly deploys
the positivist strategy of law and economics (through his description
70 MALLOY, supra note 60, at 32. Actors who are presumed under the law to be incapa-
ble of ordering their preferences (such as minors and the insane) are deemed to be legally
incompetent and therefore "cannot conclude an enforceable contract." COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 65, at 206. Although legal incompetence generally enables a party to avoid
contractual obligations, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Hauer v. Union State Bank, 532
N.W.2d 456, 462-66 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that, in the absence of special circum-
stances obviating restitution, a mental incompetent may disaffirm a contract but must
make restitution of consideration received from the counterparty); Dodson v. Shrader, 824
S.W.2d 545, 549-50 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that, in the absence of overreaching, undue
influence, or other unfairness to the minor party, the counterparty is entitled upon the
minor's disaffirmation of the contract to reasonable compensation for depreciation of or
damage to the counterparty's consideration).
71 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 65, at 206-07.
72 POSNER, supra note 49, § 4.1, at 103. Posner also states that "it is not always obvious
when a party is behaving opportunistically." Id.
73 Id. § 4.1, at 108.
74 See Burton, supra note 22, at 371-72.




of cases in which courts applied the then-unnamed forgone opportu-
nities approach),76 but also successfully presents his normative argu-
ment. His advocacy of a particularized factual inquiry into the
attempted recapture of forgone opportunities is one that is explicitly
economic and sharply focused on the notion of costs, 77 one of the
foundational concepts of law and economics. Thus, the forgone op-
portunities approach is essentially an economic analysis of the doc-
trine of good faith.
3. The Less Obvious Case: Excluder Analysis
In contrast to Burton's forgone opportunities approach, Sum-
mers's excluder analysis of the doctrine of good faith appears to be
grounded in fundamental notions of fairness, rather than in eco-
nomic analysis. 78 Practically speaking, however, this Article suggests
that the scope of the duty of good faith under the excluder analysis
approach-its ability to preclude various kinds of bad faith conduct-
tends ultimately to foster conditions that contribute toward an eco-
nomically perfect contracting environment, and not to foster condi-
tions leading toward a level of equality consistent with expansive
notions of justice.
79
In his 1968 article, Summers extracts from case law several dis-
tinct forms of bad faith conduct and their good faith counterparts.80
For example, a seller acts in bad faith by concealing a defect in his
product; the good faith counterpart is the seller's full disclosure of
material facts.8 ' In economic terms, a crucial condition of the ideal
contracting environment is that all contracting parties have access to
"full information about the nature and consequences of [their]
choice [s]."82 Another example of an act of bad faith is a contractor
who openly abuses his bargaining power to coerce an increase in con-
tract price; the good faith counterpart is to refrain from the abuse of
76 See Burton, supra note 22, at 387-92.
77 Cf id. at 375-76 (outlining a "wholly economic description of contracting costs").
78 See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing Summers's excluder analysis theory of good faith);
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 19, § 7.17, at 504 ("Th[e] implied duty [of good faith] is
based on fundamental notions of fairness.").
79 Cf infta Part Il.A.2 (discussing Kimberl6 Crenshaw's critique of antidiscrimination
law as legitimatizing racial subordination, and her reconceptualization of the expansive
goals of antidiscrimination law).
80 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 203.
81 Id. (citing Stewart v. Wyo. Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888)).
82 COOTER & ULEN, 1988 LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 67, at 235 (emphasis omit-
ted); see also Robin Paul Malloy, Invisible Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner
and the Philosophy of Law and Economics, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 209, 243 (1988) (stating that the




bargaining power.83 Similarly, a party who enters into an agreement
and then prevents the other party from deriving the benefits of the
agreement acts in bad faith; the good faith counterpart is to act coop-
eratively.84 These excluder-analysis good faith prohibitions against
abusive or uncooperative conduct effectuate another economic goal,
because they deter contracting parties from behaving opportunisti-
cally toward one another, which, Posner has stated, "obviate [s] costly
self-protective measures."85 Because a perfect contracting environ-
ment requires minimal transaction costs,86 these good faith prohibi-
tions further economic goals by preventing both contracting parties
from incurring extraneous transaction costs arising after contract
formation.
8 7
The application of conventional economic analysis to contract
law suggests that, in a perfect contracting environment, judicial inter-
vention would be necessary to invalidate contracts only in the most
egregious of circumstances (e.g., if one party has induced the other
contracting party, through fraud or duress, to enter into the agree-
ment).88 Such judicial intervention would be inappropriate, however,
if the agreement were merely unfair to one of the parties. As stated
more succinctly by Malloy, "[t] he market does not care about ... fair-
ness orjustice .... As long as there are no artificial barriers to success,
no one should be offended by the functioning of the market."89 This
particular assumption is inconsistent with Summers's stated conclu-
sion about the role and purpose of the good faith obligation in con-
tract law, which is to ensure fairness in the contracting process.°° Yet,
the doctrine of good faith, even in its excluder analysis form, is fre-
quently applied to achieve the conditions required to construct a per-
fect contracting environment.
Decisions in two recent cases exemplify the ways in which applica-
tions of the excluder analysis yield economically driven results. For
example, in Kleiner v. First National Bank,91 the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia used a definition of good faith that
adopts the excluder analysis approach in recognizing the validity of
the plaintiffs' claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
83 Summers, Good Faith, supra note 5, at 203 (citing Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brew-
ery Co., 15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1891)).
84 Id. (citing Carns v. Bassick, 175 N.Y.S. 670, 673 (App. Div. 1919)).
85 POSNER, supra note 49, § 4.1, at 103.
86 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 65, at 207-12; POSNER, supra note 49, § 4.1, at 108.
87 See COOTER & ULEN, 1988 LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 67, at 236; MALLOY, supra
note 60, at 34-38.
88 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 65, at 261-64, 275-77.
89 MALLOY, supra note 60, at 32.
90 See Summers, General Duty, supra note 5, at 826.
91 581 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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and fair dealing.92 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged in pertinent part
that the defendant bank breached its contractual obligation of good
faith by charging interest on the plaintiffs' loans in a manner inconsis-
tent with the terms of the promissory notes they had signed.93 The
relevant term at issue concerned the rate of interest on the loans,
which was denominated the "prime rate" in the notes.94 Although the
prime rate was defined in the notes, the bank argued that its meaning
should instead be interpreted in accordance with the trade meaning
of the term prime rate.95 The court quoted language from the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts section 205, which describes the excluder
analysis approach,9 6 and noted that "[a]rguably, where an agreement
permits one party to unilaterally determine the extent of the other's
required performance, an obligation of good faith in making such a
determination is implied. '9 7 The court then denied the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for summary judgment, but allowed the question of whether the
prime rates were good faith estimates to go to the jury.98
Although the Kleiner court employed the Restatement's excluder
analysis approach to good faith, the facts appear more compatible
with the purely economic forgone opportunities approach. The
court's analysis of the facts in Kleiner seemed to depend on whether
the bank legitimately exercised its discretion in setting the prime rate
and, if not, on whether the bank was attempting to recapture an op-
portunity to reset those rates in a manner it knew it had forgone at the
time of contract formation. 99 This analysis is precisely what Burton's
forgone opportunities approach contemplates. 00 Thus, the Kleiner
court would have reached the same conclusion under a forgone op-
portunities approach as it did under the Restatement's excluder
analysis.
Kleiner illustrates that although the differences between the two
approaches to good faith performance remain pure in theory, they
are easily elided in practice in purely commercial cases. If those theo-
retically divergent meanings are conflated in practice, then the theo-
retical distinction between the approaches is rendered meaningless.
Although this does not present a significant analytical problem in
cases like Kleiner, the question remains whether the eliding of these
92 See id. at 960 n.5 (relying in part on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981)
approach to good faith, which adopts Summers's excluder analysis).
93 See id. at 957-58.
94 See id. at 958-59.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 960 n.5.
97 Id. at 960.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 959-60.
100 See Burton, supra note 22, at 387-92.
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theoretical differences ever matters. Are there cases in which the the-
oretical distinction between the good faith approaches should be
revived?
The case of Larson v. Larson'01 suggests an affirmative answer to
that question, although probably because it is a divorce case rather
than a commercial case. Larson involved a settlement agreement be-
tween former spouses, and the term at issue concerned the payment
of alimony.10 2 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Mr. Larson
agreed to pay alimony and child support to Mrs. Larson in a set
monthly amount until the emancipation of their youngest child, and
thirty percent of his gross earned income thereafter.10 3 The Larsons'
settlement agreement also stated that both parties intended the agree-
ment to govern their obligations independently, regardless of future
events that might change either of their positions.' 04 After the eman-
cipation of their youngest child, Mr. Larson-an apparently healthy
fifty-five year old-retired and stopped making alimony payments,
claiming that he had no earned income.'0 5 Mrs. Larson subsequently
filed a motion to modify the settlement agreement due to the
changed circumstances of her ex-husband.'0 6 The lower court
granted the motion.10 7
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Appeals Court of Mas-
sachusetts set forth some additional facts about the Larsons' relation-
ship. When the couple divorced in 1983, Mr. Larson had an annual
earned income of $90,000, an annual unearned income of approxi-
mately $10,000, and net assets worth almost $600,000.108 Mrs. Larson
was a homemaker who had been financially dependent on her hus-
band during their marriage and whose net worth was "modest."'1 9 At
the time Mrs. Larson filed her motion to modify the settlement agree-
ment, Mr. Larson had retired and was living on $50,000 per year of
unearned income, and had a net worth of approximately
$1,000,000.110 Mrs. Larson had a weekly earned income of $97, a
weekly unearned income of $104, and assets worth about $400,000.111
101 636 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
102 See id. at 1366-67.
103 Id. at 1366.
104 Id.
1o5 See id. at 1366-67.
106 Id. at 1366.
107 Id. The trial court ordered Mr. Larson to pay approximately $1,000 per month in
alimony. Id. at 1367.
108 Id. at 1366.
109 Id.
I lo Id.




The appellate court also discussed at length Mr. Larson's breach
of his duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of the
settlement agreement.ll 2 The court stated that Mr. Larson's decision
to retire at the age of fifty-five, while in good health, without otherwise
providing for his ex-wife's support, "deprived the wife of her reasona-
bly anticipated fruits of the separation agreement and amounted to an
'evasion of the spirit of the bargain."' 113 What is striking about the
appellate court's reasoning and its reliance on the excluder analysis
approach is the absence of language that refers explicitly to the guid-
ing principles of fairness, equality, and justice, even though the facts,
which the appellate court restated in detail, easily warrant at least
mention of those principles. 114 Only the concurring judge recog-
nized that Mr. Larson's early and abrupt retirement was "patently un-
fair," 1 5 and acknowledged the "emotional, and ofttimes irrational"' 16
nature of divorce cases. The absence of similar language in the major-
ity opinion raises the following question: Why are legal analyses of
noneconomic or only partially economic facts so often discussed ex-
clusively in economic terms, even in cases in which the law cited to
support these analyses theoretically dictates or at least permits consid-
eration of noneconomic factors such as fairness and equality?
117
In arguing that the excluder analysis functions practically as an
economic model, this Article does not suggest that the Kleiner and Lar-
son courts reached the wrong results, or that their decisions are the
result of a misunderstanding of the excluder analysis. Nor does this
Article contend that courts should not use the duty of good faith per-
1 12 See id at 1367-68.
113 Id. at 1368 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981)).
114 The lower court also discussed the case in more economic than equitable terms,
although its reasoning certainly implicates some policy issues as well:
"[The husband's interpretation of the agreement] would place an undue
hardship and reduction in the standard of living of the wife which neither
she nor the Court, which passed on the fairness of the original agreement,
would reasonably have anticipated. It is one thing to exclude unearned
income as a source of alimony when the husband was a successful surgeon
with many years of productive earnings before him but quite another mat-
ter when that husband at the age of fifty-five... in excellent health volunta-
rily retires in order to pursue another lifestyle. The husband is entitled to
retire, but he is not entitled to place the total economic burden of that
voluntary act upon his former wife of many years who because of a lack of
earning capacity and the loss of alimony at a point in time where she could
not put aside enough for her later years is not rendered a public charge but
is reduced to very modest standard of living well below that to which she
was accustomed both during and after the marriage."
Id. at 1367 (quoting the unpublished opinion of the probate judge below) (second altera-
tion in original).
115 Id. at 1368 (Brown, J., concurring).
116 Id. at 1369 (Brown, J., concurring).
117 For a discussion of the definition of equality advanced in this Article, see supra note
14.
1046 [Vol. 88:1025
2003] CRITICAL INTER VENTIONS 1047
formance to optimize efficiency in the exchange process. It simply
takes issue with the way in which courts have deployed the doctrine of
good faith as an alternate means to effect an economic analysis of the
law. Thus, this Article intends to critique the economic analysis of the
doctrine of good faith and to revive the old debate between Burton
and Summers, taking sides with Summers but from a more critical
perspective.
C. Critique of the Economic Model of Good Faith
The Chicago School of Law and Economics, as Posner himself
concedes, can fairly be categorized as both politically and economi-
cally conservative.' 18 Now, however, almost thirty years after the publi-
cation of the first edition of Economic Analysis of Law,"9 law and
economics scholarship embodies the spectrum of political ideolo-
gies. 120 Legal scholars situated both to the right 21 and to the
118 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 163,
165-66 (1990). As Posner has stated:
I consider myself to be a pragmatic economic libertarian .... By liberta-
rian, I mean someone who believes in minimum government-as little gov-
ernment as possible. I mean someone who is suspicious of public
intervention, who thinks that people should look to themselves rather than
to their government for their happiness, their future, their success in life. I
mean a practitioner of laissez faire in a general sense, not in a literal sense.
I mean a small government person....
The reason I affixed the adjective "economic" is not that I am protective
only of economic liberty... but that I use economic theory to try to figure
out what the appropriate boundaries of the minimum state are. Basically
my view is that the role of government is to intervene and correct ... seri-
ous market failures....
My third term, pragmatic, comes from my opening remark about not being
enthusiastic about moral discourse.... My point is only that I do not in-
tend to try to derive my free-market views from something more fundamen-
tal, more rigorously philosophical. And the consequence of this lack of
foundations is that I am not dogmatically attached to any of my free-market
views.
Id.
119 See POSNER, supra note 51.
120 For an excellent primer on the various approaches to law and economics scholar-
ship, see generally MALLOY, supra note 60. Malloy argues that:
The proper study of law and economics should ... require us to evaluate
alternative social arrangements while exploring the consequences that such
alternatives have on the relationship between law and economics.... [T] he
primary goal of law and economics should be to investigate how certain
values or principles will be affected by changing a community's current so-
cial, political, and economic arrangements.
Id. at 4. Thus, Malloy argues that the study of law and economics requires a comparative
approach. Id. at 5. In his analysis, Malloy discusses and compares the conservative, liberal,
left communitarian and neo-Marxist, libertarian, and classical liberal approaches to law
and economics, see id. at 60-101, and applies those readings to various cases in contract,
property, criminal, constitutional, employment, and tort law, see id. at 104-54.
121 For example, in mounting a controversial argument against employment discrimi-
nation laws, Richard Epstein has argued that discrimination based on irrational hatred of
or distaste for people belonging to certain classifications (such as women or minorities)
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left 122 of Posner engage in law and economics scholarship, either by
arguing to extend its conservative, free-market direction across various
areas of substantive law, or by attacking, deconstructing, or rerouting
its direction toward a more values-based theory of law and econom-
ics. 12 3 Yet, it is the conservative model of law and economics that re-
mains well entrenched within the legal academy.' 2 4 Because of that
will be extinguished by market forces because such distaste is inefficient, but that "volun-
tary sorting" based on "commonality of preferences"-which often tracks along racial, eth-
nic, or gender lines-will (and should) survive because it increases satisfaction in the
workplace by allowing workers to avoid distasteful associations. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 66-69 (1992).
But see Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Market Settings,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67 (1994) (critiquing Epstein's libertarian analysis of discrimination
law). Even Posner has criticized Epstein's libertarian views, stating that Epstein's Lockean
view of natural rights, which informs his model of law and economics, "derive [s] a sense of
minimum government smaller than even I think appropriate." Posner, supra note 118, at
171.
122 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 181 n.5, 200
(1980) (indirectly engaging law and economics by constructing, in part, a liberal "ideal
transactional structure" on economic terms that would "affirm ... the right of every citizen
to exchange goods, services, and meanings with his fellows on terms that do not require
him to concede that his search for the good is any less important than his fellows' pursuit
of happiness"); Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986
DUKE L.J. 929, 940, 942 (arguing that "neoclassical economics takes an extremely reduc-
tionist view of culture in general and conversation in particular," and "categorically re-
ject[ing] . . . the standard economist's condescending attitude toward other disciplines
that do take seriously the deep problems that are generated every time social meanings are
exchanged through symbolic processes"); Shubha Ghosh, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Termination Rights: A Fresh Look at the Employment at Will Debate with Applications to Franchising
and Family Law, 75 OR. L. REv. 969, 979-1016 (1996) (arguing that economic models'
presumptions in favor of at-will employment relationships erroneously assume the absence
of positive and negative externalities in employment contracts, and observing public
ramifications of such "private" employment agreements); Robin Paul Malloy, Is Law and
Economics Moral?-Humanistic Economics and a Classical Liberal Critique of Posner's Economic
Analysis, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 147 (1990) (promoting a classical liberal approach to law and
economics that disputes the underlying values of Posner's view of law and economics).
Indeed, even scholars to the far left of Posner have at times engaged law and economic
scholarship. See, e.g., Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of Dei-
ndividualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709 (1995) (incorporating cultural
studies into a law and economics analysis); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1740-53, 1762-66, 1776 (1976) (arguing, in rele-
vant part, that economic principles embedded in legal rules and standards are "instrumen-
tal to [and not independent of] the pursuit of substantive objectives"). Significantly, both
legal and nonlegal feminist scholars also have critiqued the Chicago School and have pro-
posed alternate models for economic analysis as well as law and economics analysis. See,
e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); Hadfield, supra note
11.
123 See supra notes 121-22.
124 See Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 503,
504-06 (describing the "[h]egemony of [e]conomic [a]nalysis" in law); Fiss, supra note 65,
at 2 (discussing the disparate representation of critical legal scholars and judges compared
to their law and economics counterparts on "top-tier" law faculties and the federal bench);
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword: Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power, Inter/National Labor
Rights and the Evolution of LatCrit Theo~y and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 575, 655-56
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discourse's descriptive and normative power, this Article attempts to
reapply law and economics analysis to contract law through a discus-
sion and critique of the implied obligation of good faith from a criti-
cal race as well as law and market economy perspective.
II
ROBIN PAUL MALLOY'S "LAw AND MARKET
ECONOMVY" THEORY
A particularly important critique of the conservative model of law
and economics-Malloy's theory of law and market economy1 25 -war-
rants detailed discussion here. Malloy's critique and reinterpretation
of law and economics, utilizing economic and market terms, enables
critical scholars to better evaluate the economic analysis of the law.
This is important because critical scholars must reckon with the reality
and problems of the market, especially in the contractual context, as
well as with the institutional entrenchment and depoliticization of the
economic analysis of the law.
In developing his theory of law and market economy, Malloy ar-
gues that the existing, highly influential law and economics discourse
is flawed because it unrealistically and inaccurately assumes the pri-
macy of efficiency in its understanding of both the exchange process
and market theory. 126 By deploying a semiotic analysis and reinter-
pretation of law and economics, Malloy persuasively argues that crea-
tivity and discovery, not efficiency, drive wealth formation and
maximization. 
27
Malloy's innovation as a law and economics scholar is not only
substantive, but also methodological. Malloy uses Peircian semiotics,
derived from the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce,1 28 to reinter-
(1999) (contrasting the marginalization in the legal academy of critical and other "out-
sider" legal scholars with the preferential treatment of law and economics scholars).
125 MALLOY, supra note 10.
126 See id. at 2-4.
127 See id. passim.
128 Charles Sanders Peirce was an influential twentieth century American philosopher
who "provided the theoretical foundation for Legal Realism," and who is "generally ac-
knowledged... as one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century for whom the law served
as prototype for a general theory of signs." Roberta Kevelson, Introduction to 1 LAw AND
SEMIOTICS 1, 14 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1987). Peirce was a contemporary of Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, and both were members of the Metaphysical Club, a discussion group that
met regularly in Cambridge, Massachusetts in the early 1870s. ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE
LAw AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 8 (1988);John T. Valauri, Peirce and Holmes, in 1 PEIRCE AND LAw:
ISSUES IN PRAGMATISM, LEGAL REALISM, AND SEMIOTICS 187, 187 (Roberta Kevelson ed.,
1991). Legal semioticians have argued that Holmes came to legal realism indirectly by way
of Peirce's semiotic theory and philosophical pragmatism. See KEVELSON, supra, at 5-8. But
see Valauri, supra, at 187-88 (asserting that the proof of influence between Peirce and
Holmes is "ultimately contradictory and inconclusive").
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pret the values of law and economics. 129 Semiotics is the science or
study of signs, and can loosely be described as a type of linguistic the-
ory that explains the formation and reproduction of linguistic struc-
tures.13° Its more philosophical derivations, of which Peircian
semiotics is one, are concerned with the "process of 'knowing,' and
the construction of meaning and value within a dialogic or relational
system of exchange," which are grounded in experience and
history. 
3 1'
As Malloy's semiotic reinterpretation demonstrates, the most sig-
nificant interpretive concept that Peircian semiotics imparts is that the
processes of legal analysis and interpretation are additive. 1'3 2 In other
words, one who engages in legal discourse generally filters her analysis
through several different screens or lenses of interpretation, and no
single screen is the only screen through which she should interpret
the law. For example, this Article is filtered through the multiple
lenses of critical race theory, law and market economy theory, and law
and economics. Each of those discourses is only one screen through
which an individual may interpret or understand the law, and each of
those discourses may in turn be constituted of multiple other screens.
The additive nature of legal analysis is certainly not a new discovery; it
is something that all law students learn in the first year of law school,
when they are introduced to common law and the casebook pedagogy
that dominates the doctrinal classroom. This additive nature is partic-
ularly relevant from a critical perspective because of the potentially
infinite ways, for example, one may interpret, reproduce, reinterpret,
and reconstruct the meaning of good faith.
129 MALLOY, supra note 10, at 23.
130 See id. at 29. See generally WINFRIED NOTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS (1990) (provid-
ing a comprehensive overview of the vast field of semiotic research).
131 MALLOY, supra note 10, at 29; see id. at 32-33. Because semiotics examines the pro-
cess of knowing, it enabled the development of much constructionist, postmodern, and
deconstructionist thought. See Hall, supra note 54, at 36 ("The underlying argument be-
hind the [Saussurian] semiotic approach is that, since all cultural objects convey meaning,
and all cultural practices depend on meaning, they must make use of signs .... "); id. at
30-39. Hall further links semiotics to the formation and circulation of power through
discursive formations and practices. See id. at 41-51. Moreover, some law and semiotics
scholars have argued that the critical legal studies movement, see infra Part IlA, is linked
directly to semiotics. SeeJ.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Seniotics, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1831
(1991); Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEx. L. Rxv. 1779 (1991). Analo-
gously, one of the goals of this Article is to develop further connections between semiotics
and critical race theory that may contribute to fields of scholarship.
132 See MALLOY, supra note 10, at 61-69 (arguing that the study of "the relationship
between law and market theory... should... focus on the implications and consequences




Thus, Peircian semiotic interpretation of the legal term, or, semi-
otically speaking, "sign," 133 good faith illustrates that it lacks a single
true meaning. Contractual good faith may mean one thing to a criti-
cal race scholar, another to a conventional law and economics scholar,
and another to a law and market economy scholar. A practicing com-
mercial lawyer, depending on his client's problem, will argue for a
judicial definition of good faith that is consistent with one, all, or
none of those scholarly interpretations. The production of meaning,
and of legal meaning in particular, is relational in nature, and the
meaning of any given sign, such as good faith, is subject to constantly
shifting interpretations. This indeterminacy is exemplified by the the-
oretical debate between Burton and Summers over the proper formu-
lation of a standard of good faith.
Although extreme applications of this principle of indetermi-
nacy 134 may lead ultimately to the destabilization of various legal doc-
trines and concepts, those engaged in Peircian semiotics would not
employ such extreme applications. 135 In this respect, Peircian semio-
ticians and critical race scholars perhaps share something in common:
a refusal to forgo legal reform as a vehicle for progressive social
change. Peircian semiotics recognizes certain limitations on interpre-
tation, which exist because meaning is not only relational in nature,
but also experiential1 36 and communal.1 37 That is, meaning refer-
ences community. 1 3 Thus, for example, good faith may have a partic-
ular descriptive or normative meaning to a community of critical race
scholars, who would generally agree that good faith does and should
prohibit racist conduct in the contracting process. Meaning also ref-
133 See NOTH, supra note 130, at 42 (describing Peirce's "sign model as consisting of a
triple connection of sign, thing signified, cognition produced in the mind' (internal quotation
omitted)); id. at 79-91 (discussing generally the concept of sign); see also UMBERTO Eco,
SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 14-45 (1984) (discussing signs); MALLOY,
supra note 10, at 29-36 (providing a brief overview of semiotics and discussing the concept
of sign).
134 See infra Part III.A (discussing critical legal scholarship's focus on the indetermi-
nacy of legal rules).
135 See, e.g., MALLOY, supra note 10, at 161 ("A second weakness in the critical approach
[to law] is that it typically fails to recognize that all complex systems, including the market
exchange process, are... determinate in some respects (habit and convention based), and
indeterminate in other respects (influenced by chance, surprise, and creative discovery).");
see also UMBERTO Eco, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION 37-41 (1990) (arguing that, al-
though Peircian semiotics may welcome the notion of "unlimited semiosis" by the inter-
preter, "the process of semiosis produces in the long run a socially shared notion of the
thing that the community is engaged to take as if it were in itself true").
136 See MALLOY, supra note 10, at 67, 76.
137 See Eco, supra note 135, at 40-41.
138 See MALLOY, supra note 10, at 46, 57-77.
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erences experience and, by extension, history, 1' 9 which suggests, for
example, that Black or female consumers who have negotiated con-
tracts for the purchase of new cars may believe that the particular con-
tracting process is infected with bad faith conduct, while their White
and male counterparts may disagree. 14  In short, Malloy's semiotic
reinterpretation of law and economics takes account of politics, com-
munity, and culture.141
Malloy's semiotic critique of the dominant role of efficiency in
law and economics discourse takes issue primarily with the overly "de-
terminate process" of an efficiency calculus situated firmly "within a
static and closed environment" and based on "habit, convention, and
continuity."' 42 That is, Malloy takes issue not with the role of effi-
ciency as the principal motivator of wealth formation, but rather with
the fact that it dominates economic legal analysis in a manner incon-
sistent with the shifting and dynamic nature of socioeconomic reality.
From a semiotic perspective, the dominant, efficiency-driven interpre-
tive model is an inadequate or at best imperfect lens through which to
evaluate the market and market exchanges because it fails to give pri-
119 See Hall, supra note 54, at 41-44 (arguing that power circulates through the produc-
tion of knowledge, which in turn depends on who is historically situated to engage in
certain discursive practices).
140 Ian Ayres has explored in great depth the phenomenon of discrimination in retail
car negotiations. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991); Ian Ayres, FurtherEvidence of Discrimination in
New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REv. 109 (1995).
141 "Culture" is difficult to define, because its meaning is dependent on context. Stu-
art Hall, a pioneer of cultural studies, provides a simplified definition of the term as it is
used in this Article:
In recent years, and in a more 'social science' context, the word 'culture' is
used to refer to whatever is distinctive about the 'way of life' of a people,
community, nation or social group. This has come to be known as the 'an-
thropological' definition. Alternatively, the word can be used to describe
the 'shared values' of a group or of society-which is like the anthropologi-
cal definition, only with a more sociological emphasis....
What has come to be called the 'cultural turn' in the social and human
sciences ...has tended to emphasize the importance of meaning to the
definition of culture. Culture ... is not so much a set of things-novels and
paintings or TV programmes and comics-as a process, a set of practices.
Primarily, culture is concerned with the production and the exchange of
meanings-the 'giving and taking of meaning'-between the members of a
society or group. To say that two people belong to the same culture is to
say that they interpret the world in roughly the same ways and can express
themselves, their thoughts and feelings about the world, in ways which will
be understood by each other. Thus culture depends on its participants in-
terpreting meaningfully what is happening around them, and 'making
sense' of the world, in broadly similar ways.
Stuart Hall, Introduction to REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING
PRACTICES, supra note 54, at 1, 2.




macy to the dynamic nature of market choice, which is grounded in
how decision makers interpret incentives and disincentives.143
Taking the Peircian reinterpretive turn that emphasizes the inde-
terminacy of meaning, Malloy emphasizes creativity as the linchpin of
wealth formation because it is "grounded in an environment of poten-
tiality, of discontinuity, and indeterminacy"144-i.e., because it recog-
nizes the shifting nature of interpretive processes. Yet, because
Peircian semiotics also teaches that the interpretation of meaning,
though indeterminate, is limited by communal, experiential, and his-
torical constructs of meaning, the semiotic creative process is in-
formed by "an ethical environment of social responsibility" that is
constantly evolving.
14 5
Malloy also challenges the way in which the discourse of law and
economics creates a certain understanding of market choice. 146 He
exposes, in theoretical terms, a near-universal commonsense under-
standing: that market actors are not necessarily rational and objective,
that they may not always make choices based on pseudo-scientific,
cost-benefit analyses, and that they may not necessarily agree on what
constitutes a cost or a benefit. 147 Although market choice may be in-
formed in part by a cold cost-benefit analysis, it is more significantly
informed by "our experiences as participants in dynamic networks
and patterns of social intercourse.' 48 Simply stated, if deals that are
efficient in terms of the bottom line are not always fair to the individu-
als and communities they affect, why should the bottom line matter
more than what is fair?
Malloy does not claim that efficiency analysis has no role to play
in the interpretation of the market, or that other methods should re-
place efficiency analysis. 149 After all, the concepts associated with
traditional law and economics occupy significant space within legal
discourse. Rather, Malloy claims that efficiency analysis should not
have a dominant role in the study of market theory and the exchange
process.
1 50
Malloy's semiotic model of law and market economy, together
with critical race interpretations of what the law means for people of
color, guides this Article's critique of the existing models of contrac-
tual good faith. It is not the Article's objective to propose a replace-
143 See id. at 2-4.
144 Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
145 Id.
146 See id. at 3-4.
147 See id. at 57-77; supra note 11 and accompanying text.
148 MALLOY, supra note 10, at 4.
149 See id. at 3.
150 See id.
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ment for the current excluder analysis model of good faith, but rather
to suggest a justifiable addition to its meaning.
III
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS
A. History and Guiding Principles
Francisco Valdes, a notable critical race and LatCrit15 1 scholar,
has aptly termed critical race theory "social justice scholarship."' 5 2 As
such, critical race theory provides an important additional screen
through which to filter the doctrine of good faith. Although critical
race scholarship originated in and continues to grow primarily out of
the legal academy, it is interdisciplinary insofar as the disciplines from
which it draws are concerned with sociopolitical and socioeconomic
racial inequality. 153 Thus, there is no single, unifying methodology
for engaging in critical race analysis. 154 In fact, this lack of a single
methodology is one of critical race theory's enduring features. 15
5
Critical race theory emerged in the 1980s as a response by pro-
gressive scholars of color to the critical legal studies (CLS) move-
ment. 156 The CLS movement originated in the late 1970s as a
151 Although it is difficult to define singularly LatCrit theory, Valdes has defined it
generally as "the emerging field of legal scholarship that examines critically the social and
legal positioning of Latinas/os, especially Latinas/os within the United States, to help rec-
tify the shortcomings of existing social and legal conditions." Francisco Valdes, Foreword:
Under Construction-LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1089
n.2 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 3 n.2 (1998); see also Iglesias, supra note 124 (reconceptualiz-
ing the notion of "community" and its role in the LatCrit movement).
152 Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritar-
ianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as
Cultural Warriors, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 1409 passim (1998).
153 1 suggest that the vast body of critical race scholarship incorporates and synthesizes
aspects of political philosophy, science, sociology, critical legal studies, feminist theory,
feminist legal theory, cultural and ethnic studies, semiotics, literary studies, postmodern-
ism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism. This list, I am certain, is nowhere near
complete.
154 See Chantal Thomas, Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development Theory: Observa-
tions on Methodology, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1195 (2000) (identifying four strands of critical meth-
odology that have been deployed by some critical race scholars).
155 See Introduction to CRrncAL RACE THEORY: THE CUrrING EDGE, at xiii, xiv-xv (Rich-
ard Delgado ed., 1995) [hereinafter CU-rINc. EDGE];Introduction to CRrTCAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED T1E MOVEMENT, at xiii, xiii (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter KEY WRITINGS].
156 An excellent discussion of the historical development of critical race theory is in-
cluded in the introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings, one of two critical race
theory readers published in 1995. See CUTT7INc. EDCE, supra note 155; KEY WRrrINGS, supra
note 155, at xix-xxvii. These two readers are of particular importance because they were
compiled and edited by some of the founders of and key contributors to critical race
scholarship.
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derivative of Legal Realism, 157 whose followers in the 1920s and 1930s
criticized the rule of law and its application as overly formalistic 158 and
as cloaking in the myths of neutrality and objectivity'5 9 a legal system
that in reality was driven by policy, economics, and politics. 16°1 The
Realists sometimes manifested this critique in the form of "rule skepti-
cism," which recognized that legal rules are "not what they appear to
be." 16 ' In more concrete terms, the Realists argued that the formalis-
tic notion of the rule of law created an illusion of certainty that
masked the unspoken social and political assumptions guiding much
judicial decision making. 162 The exposure of this illusion of certainty
157 See KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at xvii-xxvii; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1-2 (1983).
158 See UNGER, supra note 157, at 1. In The Critical Legal Studies Movement, Unger was
careful to define that which he critiqued. Of "formalism" he wrote:
Formalism ... is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possi-
bility of, a method of legal justification that contrasts with open-ended dis-
putes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call
ideological, philosophical, or visionary. Such conflicts fall far short of the
closely guarded canon of inference and argument that the formalist claims
for legal analysis. This formalism holds impersonal purposes, policies, and
principles to be indispensable components of legal reasoning.
Id.
159 See id. at 1-2. Of "objectivism," Unger wrote:
Objectivism is the belief that the authoritative legal materials-the system
of statutes, cases, and accepted legal ideas-embody and sustain a defensi-
ble scheme of human association. They display, though always imperfectly,
an intelligible moral order. Alternatively they show the results of practical
constraints upon social life-constraints such as those of economic effi-
ciency-that, taken together with constant human desires, have a norma-
tive force. The laws are not merely the outcome of contingent power
struggles or of practical pressures lacking in rightful authority.
Id. at 2.
160 See id. at 1-4.
161 MARK TEBBIT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: AN INTRODUCTION 29-30 (2000); see also Brian
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REv. 267, 275
(1997) (noting that "the Core Claim of Legal Realism is that judges reach decisions based
on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case").
162 See TEBBIT, supra note 161, at 26-29. As Justice Holmes famously observed:
What constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you that it
is something different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts
or England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from princi-
ples of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coin-
cide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad man
we shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions,
but that he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are
likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law.
O.W. Holmes,Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 460-61 (1897). Karl Llewellyn,
among the most important and well known of the Realists, also argued that commercial law
developed into its modern, stabilized state not because it embodied and formalistically
enacted a set of legal rules, but because particularized social and economic circumstances
compelled the judicial creation of a body of law that developed into a coherent doctrine.
See Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship,
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led to Realist pronouncements of the indeterminate nature of the
law. 163
Critical legal scholars (crits) pushed the Realist critique of for-
malism and objectivity to its outer limits through their deconstruction
of the law,164 whereby they described the law not only as political, but
also as so indeterminate that no rational normative structure could be
imposed upon it.16 5 Further, through their methodology of delegiti-
mation, a process by which they destabilized the legitimacy of basic
legal concepts and legal order, 166 the crits argued generally that the
law not only is not objective and not neutral, but that it is indetermi-
nate, political, ideological,1 67 and hegemonic. 68 For example, Ro-
95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1671-73 (1982) (discussing Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality,
and Society (pts. 1 & 2), 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699 (1936), 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341 (1937)).
163 See TEBBIT, supra note 161, at 26-32.
164 The practice of deconstruction, itself an outgrowth of poststructuralism, "disman-
tle[s] the structures of meaning so as to expose the premises on which they are built and to
reveal the concepts of objectivity and linguistic autonomy as constructs .... Deconstructive
critical practices seek to identify power relations .. ." KEy CONCEPTS IN CULTURAL THEORY
108, 109 (Andrew Edgar & Peter Sedgwick eds., 1999); see also supra note 54 (discussing this
Article's use of the related term "discourse").
165 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 65, at 9-10; see also UNGER, supra note 157, at 118-19 (ac-
knowledging that his view of CLS suggests a "formidable gap ... between the reach of our
intellectual and political commitments and the many severe constraints upon our
situation").
166 For an example of such an analysis in a particular context, see the discussion of
Alan David Freeman's critique of antidiscrimination law, infra Part III.A.I.
167 The common understanding of the term "ideology" is inadequate with respect to
critical theory and this Article. Because ideology embodies the ideas of the dominant class,
its definition suggests that
our understanding and knowledge of the world ... is determined by politi-
cal interests. There are certain beliefs, and certain ways of seeing the
world, that will be in the interests of the dominant class (but not in the
interests of subordinate classes). For example, it was in the interests of the
dominant class in feudalism to believe in the divine right of kings.... The
dominant class is able to propagate its ideas throughout society due to its
control of various forms of communication and education (such as the
mass media, the church and schools).
KEY CONCEPTS IN CULTURAL THEORY, supra note 164, at 190 (emphasis omitted). Yet, ideol-
ogy does not necessarily dictate that subordinate classes exist obliviously in a state of shared
false consciousness. See id. This essentially Marxist, class-based view of ideology evolved
through the efforts of those like sociologist Karl Mannheim, whose work postulated the
simultaneous coexistence of multiple ideologies-multiple systems framing how different
people within a society and different people from different societies understand the world
and relate to one another. See id. at 190-91. Antonio Gramsci further developed the no-
tion of ideology through his theory of hegemony. See id. at 164-65; infra note 168.
1118 The term "hegemony" was developed primarily by the Italian neo-Marxist Antonio
Gramsci in the early twentieth century "to explain the control of the dominant class in
contemporary capitalism." KEY CONCEPTS IN CULTURAL THEORY, sufra note 164, at 164 (em-
phasis omitted). Gramsci's theory of hegemony explains that, because the dominant class
"cannot maintain control simply through the use of violence or force," it must implement
other cultural and sociopolitical apparatuses based on consent. See id. at 164-65. The
consent-based apparatuses and institutions used at various levels in society to disseminate
the dominant ideology include civil rights jurisprudence, education, the church, the me-
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berto Mangabeira Unger has rejected both the law and economics
movement (which he characterizes as addressing the private domain
and "serv[ing] the political right") and the rights and principles move-
ment (which he characterizes as addressing the public domain and
serving "the liberal center") as mere "restatements of objectivism and
formalism."16
9
Although certain scholars of color in the late 1970s and early
1980s aligned themselves with the crits' deconstructionist and delegi-
timizing agenda, they became dissatisfied with the crits' failure to ac-
knowledge, and to locate centrally, White supremacy and a
meaningful critique of racial power and racial hegemony within criti-
cal legal discourse.' 70 Thus, critical race theory developed over time
in order to effect a "race conscious intervention on the left,"171 that is,
on the critical legal studies movement itself. These scholars, or "race
crits," sought to interrogate "how law was a constitutive element of
race itself," and to "uncover ... how law constructed race."'172 Uncover-
ing the legal construction of race meant writing not only about consti-
tutional antidiscrimination and civil rights jurisprudence,17 3 but also
about other areas of law such as immigration, 74 the Japanese Ameri-
dia, and family. See id. at 164. Although Gramsci's theory of hegemony depends on con-
sent, the transmission of the dominant ideology is not simply imposed on duped classes of
nonelites; rather, the messages embedded in the dominant ideology are negotiated be-
tween the classes in their transmission. See id. at 164-65. In the field of cultural studies,
Gramsci's theory of hegemony has been especially significant because it has "facilitated
analysis of the ways in which subordinate groups actively respond to and resist political and
economic domination. The subordinate groups need not then be seen merely as the pas-
sive dupes of the dominant class and its ideology." Id. at 165 (emphasis omitted).
169 UNGER, supra note 157, at 12. Unger also characterizes the rights and principles
movement and the law and economics movement as "the most influential and symptomatic
legal theories in America today," whose advocates "stand[ ] at the margin of high power."
Id.
170 KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at xxii-xxiii.
171 Id. at xxii.
172 Id. at xxv.
173 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Re-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978).
174 See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAw: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996); Elvia R. Arriola, LatCrit Theory, International Human Rights, Popular Culture, and the
Faces of Despair in INS Raids, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 245 (1996-97); Tanya Kateri
Herndndez, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure of Immigration Controls
and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and
Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998);
Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave
Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990).
105720031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
can internment,175 criminal justice,' 76 hate speech and hate crimes, 177
affirmative action, 178 and even the ways in which biographies of Su-
preme Courtjustices construct race and hegemonic racial ideology. 179
Moreover, because the race crits, unlike their crit predecessors, did
not view legal reform as a doomed and ineffective vehicle for progres-
sive change, they set out to translate, proactively and pragmatically,
their theoretical discoveries into a program for the elimination of ra-
cial subordination.
1 8 0
Although critical race scholarship employs no single methodol-
ogy, some unifying themes and concepts have developed over the past
twenty-five years. First, critical race theory seeks to expose the en-
trenchment of White supremacy and the reality of the continued sub-
ordination of people of color in the United States (and throughout
the world' 8 1 ), and to unravel its relationship with the rule of law.
t8 2
More specifically, race crits examine how racial power constitutes and
reproduces itself through the apparatuses of law and culture. Second,
race crits are not satisfied with merely naming and understanding
their observations and discoveries; they also are committed to trans-
forming the relationship between law and hegemonic racial power in
order to destabilize that power.'8 -3 Third, like critical legal scholars,
race crits continue to reject notions of objectivity and neutrality in the
law, and the idea that legal scholarship can and should be so charac-
terized. 18 4 Thus, race crits frequently and self-consciously situate their
work in a specific cultural, historical, institutional, and political con-
175 See, e.g., EIK K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001).
176 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJustice
System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 (1995); AngelaJ. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege
of Discretion, 67 FORD-IAM L. REV. 13 (1998); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense:
Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996); Tracey L.
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998).
177 See, e.g., MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, As-
SAUL rIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Charles R. Lawrence I1l, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.
178 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Action-How Valid?, 50
AtA. L. REV. 135 (1998); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and Affirmative
Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995).
179 See Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown,
and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73 (1998), 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73
(1998).
180 See KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at xiii-xvi, xxxii.
181 See, e.g., GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER (Adrien Kath-
erine Wing ed., 2000) (anthologizing writings on women's legal rights around the world).
182 See CUTING EDGE, supra note 155, passim; KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at xiii.
183 See KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at xiii; Crenshaw, supra note 173, at 1349-69.
184 See KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at xiii; Crenshaw, supra note 173, at 1336-49.
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text. 185 In furtherance of their subversion of the notions of objectivity
and neutrality, race crits sometimes deploy unorthodox rhetorical
strategies in their scholarship, such as the use of narrative, to effect a
contextual deconstruction of the notion of objectivity. 186 Fourth, crit-
ical race theory simultaneously expresses both a profound apprecia-
tion for and a deep dissatisfaction with traditional civil rights
jurisprudence. 187 The central proposition underlying this aspect of
critical race scholarship is that racism and racist acts are not extraordi-
nary in nature, but rather are quite ordinary. 88 Because conventional
civil rights jurisprudence, in the form of antidiscrimination law, aims
to prevent and remedy only extraordinary forms of racism,1 89 race
crits have argued that antidiscrimination law is complicit in, and in
fact necessary to, the endurance of racial hegemonic power, because it
does little to reckon with the pervasiveness of racism.'19 In effecting
this particular critique of conventional civil rights and antidiscrimina-
tion law, race crits have adopted and extended critical legal scholar
Alan David Freeman's "perpetrator-victim" critique of antidiscrimina-
tion law, which is described in more detail below.
1. Overview: The Perpetrator-Victim Critique of Antidiscrimination
Law
In 1978, Alan David Freeman introduced his perpetrator-victim
critique of traditional antidiscrimination law, which asserted that the
then-existing antidiscrimination jurisprudence effectively legitimized
racial discrimination because it developed from a perpetrator, as op-
posed to a victim, perspective.' 9° Freeman identified a fundamental,
positional difference between the perpetrator and victim perspectives
on discrimination: the victim perspective views discrimination as a set
of sociopolitical conditions imposed on the victim as a "member of a
perpetual underclass,"'1 9 2 while the perpetrator perspective sees dis-
crimination "not as conditions, but as actions, or series of actions, in-
flicted on the victim by the perpetrator."19 3 Thus, argued Freeman, in
185 See, e.g., CUTrING EDGE, supra note 155, at 1-36; KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at
xxi-xxii; Crenshaw, supra note 173, at 1369-87.
186 See, e.g., CUTTING EDGE, supra note. 155, at 37-96.
187 See, e.g., KEY WRITINGS, supra note 155, at xiv, 5-57.
188 See id. at xiv.
189 See Eric K Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lauyering in Post-
Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 840 (1997) (criticizing "antidiscrimination law's
failure to address cultural discrimination and institutional racism").
190 See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO &JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM
AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION passim (1994); Bell, supra note 173; Yamamoto,
supra note 189, at 847-48, 867-70.
191 See Freeman, supra note 173, at 1052-57.
192 Id. at 1052-53.
193 Id. at 1053.
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approaching the problem of racial discrimination, the victim perspec-
tive tends to focus more broadly on eliminating the conditions ena-
bling the continued existence of racial subordination, whereas the
perpetrator perspective focuses more narrowly on "neutraliz[ing] the
inappropriate conduct of the perpetrator,"' 94 and pays little attention
to the "overall life situation of the victim class."'195
Freeman further argued that antidiscrimination law was "hope-
lessly embedded in the perpetrator perspective."' 96 Because antidis-
crimination law required victims to identify a discrete set of acts or
conduct constituting a violation on the perpetrator's part before it
would provide any remedy, 197 antidiscrimination law was "ultimately
indifferent to the condition of the victim."'198 Further, because the an-
tidiscrimination remedy focused solely on specific violations, it left no
room for consideration of the systemic conditions of racial
subordination. 199
Charles Lawrence developed Freeman's perpetrator-victim cri-
tique further when he challenged the doctrine of discriminatory pur-
pose set forth by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 20° which
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate discriminatory intent in their consti-
tutional challenges to facially neutral laws. 2 t1 In critiquing Davis, Law-
rence identified the problem of "unconscious racism," arguing that
the dichotomy articulated by the Court between intentional, unconsti-
tutional discrimination and unintentional, constitutional discrimina-
tion was a false one.2t 2 Lawrence further predicted that, in light of
194 Id.; see id. at 1053-57.
195 Id. at 1053.
196 Id.
197 See id. at 1053-57.
198 Id. at 1054 (emphasis added). More specifically, Freeman wrote:
In its core concept of the "violation," antidiscrimination law is hopelessly
embedded in the perpetrator perspective. Its central tenet, the "antidis-
crimination principle," is the prohibition of race-dependent decisions that
disadvantage members of minority groups, and its principal task has been
to select from the maze of human behaviors those particular practices that
violate the principle, outlaw the identified practices, and neutralize their
specific effects. Antidiscrimination law has thus been ultimately indifferent
to the condition of the victim; its demands are satisfied if it can be said that
the "violation" has been remedied.
The perpetrator perspective presupposes a world composed of atomistic in-
dividuals whose actions are outside of and apart from the social fabric and
without historical continuity. From this perspective, the law views racial dis-
crimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided con-
duct of particular actors.
Id. at 1053-54 (footnotes omitted).
199 See id. at 1053-57.
200 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976).
20l See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318 & n.2 (1987) (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222 (1985)).
202 Id. at 321-22.
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the historically contextualized culture of racism within which we have
all been socialized, both as victims and/or as perpetrators on some
unconscious or conscious level-the Davis Court's disregard for un-
conscious racism would in fact develop into one of antidiscrimination
law's greatest failings. 203 Both Lawrence's and Freeman's cautionary
arguments about the future of antidiscrimination law ultimately
turned out to be prophetic.
2. Overview: The Expansive and Restrictive Visions of Equality
KimberM Crenshaw has also critiqued traditional civil rights dis-
course from a critical race perspective. 20 4 Crenshaw articulates the
difference between the expansive and restrictive views of the goals of
antidiscrimination law by comparing her view with that of Thomas
Sowell, a conservative, African American, law and economics
scholar. 20 5 The expansive view, which is associated with the critical
race movement,
stresses equality as a result, and looks to real consequences for Afri-
can-Americans. It interprets the objective of antidiscrimination law
as the eradication of the substantive conditions of Black subordination
and attempts to enlist the institutional power of the courts to fur-
ther the national goal of eradicating the effects of racial appression.
20 6
The restrictive view, on the other hand,
treats equality as a process, downplaying the significance of actual
outcomes. The primary objective of antidiscrimination law, accord-
ing to this vision, is to prevent future wrongdoing rather than to
redress present manifestations of past injustice. "Wrongdoing,"
moreover, is seen primarily as isolated actions against individuals
rather than as a societal policy against an entire group. Nor does
the restrictive view contemplate the courts playing a role in re-
dressing harms from America's racist past, as opposed to merely po-
licing society to eliminate a narrow set of proscribed discriminatory
practices .... In sum, the restrictive view seeks to proscribe only
certain kinds of subordinating acts, and then only when other inter-
ests are not overly burdened.
20 7
Consequently, the adoption of the restrictive view (and similarly, the
perpetrator perspective) in civil rights discourse is not historically, so-
203 See id. at 322, 344-55.
204 See Crenshaw, supra note 173.
205 See id. at 1339-49; see also Audain, supra note 122, at 764 n.295 (criticizing Sowell's
views on the role of race and culture in determining the success of particular groups in
society).
206 Crenshaw, supra note 173, at 1341 (emphasis added); see alsoYouNG, supra note 14,
at 9 (arguing that injustice should be conceptualized primarily in terms of oppression and
domination).
207 Crenshaw, supra note 173, at 1342 (footnote omitted) (citing DERRICK A. BELL, JR.,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw § 1.12, at 41 (2d ed. 1980).
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cially, politically, or culturally contextualized, and does not address
adequately the day-to-day problems of subordinated classes. 208 Cren-
shaw's argument for adoption of the expansive view is rooted funda-
mentally in her assertion that the neoconservative interpretation of
sociopolitical power structures is ahistorical because it assumes the ab-
sence in society of hegemonic racial power and subordination. 20 9 In
her critique of the restrictive view of equality, Crenshaw does not sug-
gest that the restrictive view should be eliminated altogether. Rather,
she argues that, because equal process is inexorably and complexly
linked with equal results, the expansive view must also inform the
goals of antidiscrimination law.
2 1°
Unfortunately, it appears that civil rights discourse has moved in-
creasingly toward an exclusive adoption of the restrictive view of
equality, and has become further embedded in the perpetrator per-
spective. 2 1I This Article suggests that Crenshaw's expansive equality
approach to antidiscrimination law should be applied to substantive
areas of the law beyond the scope of civil rights and antidiscrimination
law doctrine, and that such applications should seek to eliminate the
conditions of racial subordination, rather than remedy singularly
egregious acts of racism. Specifically, this Article's primary objective is
to argue for the incorporation into contract law's doctrine of good
faith the victim perspective of expansive equality.
208 See id. at 1342-46; see a/soJoE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE
BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE vi-x, 15-18 (1994) (rebutting the notion that discrimina-
tion no longer exists, and describing discrimination confronting middle-class African
Americans).
209 See Crenshaw, supra note 173, at 1344-46. "[T]o believe ... that color-blind poli-
cies represent the only legitimate and effective means of ensuring a racially equitable soci-
ety, one would have to assume not only that there is only one 'proper role' for law, but also
that such a racially equitable society already exists." Id. at 1344.
210 See id. at 1342-44.
211 See supra Part III.A.1 (criticizing the perpetrator perspective of racial discrimina-
tion, which views discrimination as a discrete set of acts inflicted on the victim by the per-
petrator, and arguing that antidiscrimination law's focus on intentional discrimination is a
manifestation of the perpetrator perspective). This proposition is supported by a cursory
review of the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework imposed upon plain-
tiffs who bring claims of intentional discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (as amended). See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). A Title VII plaintiff must establish her prima
facie case by showing that she belongs to a protected class traditionally discriminated
against in the workplace, that she was adequately qualified, but despite her qualification,
she received adverse treatment, and that similarly situated, non-protected employees did
not receive similar treatment. See id. at 802. The employer-defendant in turn may rebut
plaintiff's prima facie case simply by producing some legally sufficient evidence of a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse treatment. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). If the employer meets this burden of production,
then the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reasons




B. A Critical Race Critique of the Economic Model
A critical race assessment of the economic model of good faith
assessment overlaps with many points of Malloy's general critique of
law and economics. First and foremost, both critical race theory and
law and market economy theory take issue with the primacy of effi-
ciency in conventional economic analyses of the law.2 1 2 Malloy, of
course, does so from a market perspective, 213 while critical race schol-
ars do so from an equality perspective.2 1 4 That is, critical race scholars
critique law and economics scholars for excessively focusing on an at-
omistic conception of individual choice, and for fundamentally "mis-
perceiv[ing] the essence of racism"2 1 5 as a perpetrator's "idiosyncratic
'taste"' 2 16 that may impact efficiency positively or negatively, rather
than as a systemic condition of subordination.
2 7
Critical race scholars also take issue with economists' criticisms of
critical race theory as overtly political, as evidenced by Posner himself
labeling some influential race crits as members of the "lunatic
fringe."2 18 Although I object to Posner's characterization of critical
race scholars, race crits do not dispute that their work is politically
situated.2 1 9 Rather, they dispute claims that law and economics is neu-
tral and objective, or that the discourse of law and economics is some-
how less political than the discourse of critical race theory. Critical
race theory and law and economics simply map two related political
terrains through two distinct lenses of interpretation. Critical race
theory interprets and maps the enabling structures of hegemonic ra-
cial power (one of which is the systemic denial to subordinated peo-
ples of opportunities to engage in exchange processes), while law and
economics interprets and maps the enabling structures of wealth for-
mation in a free market. Race crits explicitly map their terrain from
particularized political and cultural positions, while law and econom-
212 See supra notes 126, 142-50 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of
Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 121); see also Audain,
supra note 122 (arguing that law and economics scholars have disregarded the analytical
importance of culture).
215 Delgado, supra note 214, at 1195.
216 Id. at 1188.
217 See supra Part III.A. Malloy similarly critiques the conventional economic focus on
the atomistic individual, as demonstrated by his argument that wealth formation is in-
formed by both cost-benefit analysis and individuals' membership in a community. See
supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
218 Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40, 40 (book
review) ("Every intellectual movement has a lunatic fringe. Radical legal egalitarianism is
distinguished by having a rational fringe and a lunatic core. The latter is constituted by the
critical race theorists and the other legal academics who have swallowed postmodernism
hook, line, and sinker. .. ").
219 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 173, at 1342-44, 1384-87.
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ics scholars map theirs using the powerful and predictive "science" of
economics. But, as Malloy has argued from a market theory perspec-
tive, by locating the discourse in the science of economics and objec-
tivity, law and economics scholars misunderstand not only the impact
of racial subordination on the market and the exchange process, but
more fundamentally, the reinterpretive and indeterminate qualities of
the market and the exchange process in general.
220
In spite of those critiques, it appears that law and economics, as a
general discourse, may inaccurately be perceived as more objective
and less political than critical race theory. The relative proliferation
of law and economics programs, centers, and concentrations at the
"top twenty" law schools in the United States,22' as compared with the
presence of only one concentration in critical race theory at a major
law school, suggests that this perception is widespread.22 2 But despite
the fact that race crits and law and economics scholars are extremely
critical of one another, members of both movements have acknowl-
edged that the actualization of different notions ofjustice may require
the application of different legal theories to various kinds of real-life
problems. For example, Posner notes that
there is more to notions ofjustice than a concern with efficiency. It
is not obviously inefficient to allow suicide pacts; to allow private
discrimination on racial, religious, or sexual grounds; to permit kill-
ing and eating the weakest passenger in the lifeboat in circum-
stances of genuine desperation; to force people to give self-
incriminating testimony; to flog prisoners; to allow babies to be sold
220 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
221 The "top twenty" refer to those schools ranked as such by the most recent edition
of the U.S. News & World Report's annual "Best Colleges and Graduate Programs" issue.
See America's Best Graduate Schools 2003: Law Schools, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/
grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrankbrief.php. Of the law schools ranked in the top twenty,
thirteen of them have law and economics programs or centers: Yale, Stanford, Harvard,
Columbia, Cornell, Vanderbilt, University of Pennsylvania, University of Chicago, Univer-
sity of Michigan, University of Virginia, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall),
Georgetown, and University of Southern California). This research was compiled by
searching the websites of the top twenty law schools.
As Elizabeth Iglesias has noted:
Those who master the dominant language reap the rewards of assimila-
tion. . . . Law and economics aficionados get hired by elite law schools,
appointed to the federal bench, recruited for high-level policy-making posi-
tions and published in prestigious law journals at higher rates than expo-
nents of any of the major strains of critical legal discourse. By contrast,
legal scholars working to articulate critical perspectives ... are channeled
into the "interesting visitor" circuit, cast as "too political" for judicial ap-
pointment and "too abstract and theoretical" for the nitty-gritty of policy-
making.
Iglesias, supra note 124, at 655-56 (footnote omitted).
222 The University of California at Los Angeles is the only top twenty law school with a
critical race theory program. See CRS@UCLAW, at http://wwwl.law.ucla.edu/-crs/in-
dex.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2002).
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for adoption; to allow the use of deadly force in defense of a pure
property interest; to legalize blackmail; or to give convicted felons a
choice between imprisonment and participation in dangerous med-
ical experiments. Yet all these things offend the sense of justice of
modern Americans, and all are to a greater or lesser (usually
greater) extent illegal. An effort will be made ... to explain some
of these prohibitions in economic terms, but most cannot be; there is
more to justice than economics, a point the reader should keep in mind
in evaluating normative statements in this book.223
Similarly, other scholars of race and law have acknowledged the signif-
icance of the (post-)law and economics movement, as well as the need
for continued work in that area.
2 2 4
As critical race scholars substantively engage economic analysis of
the law, it becomes crucial to examine carefully the interaction of
these distinct interpretive lenses in modern legal discourse. Accord-
ingly, the remaining sections of this Article focus on a synthesis of
critical race theory and Malloy's law and market economy scholarship
in the context of the doctrine of contractual good faith. The theoreti-
cal debate surrounding the doctrine of good faith provides an appro-
priate doctrinal context for examining the interaction of critical and
economic analysis, because that debate has historically pitted eco-
nomic analysis (e.g., Burton's forgone opportunities approach)
against independent conceptions of justice (e.g., Summers's excluder
analysis). Moreover, the theoretical distinction between economy and
justice is often elided in contract law because contract disputes are
particularly susceptible to economic analyses. But is this susceptibility
merely a function of convenience, or do economic analyses in con-
tract disputes yield the fairest results? Is it true, as Malloy has asserted,
that "[t]he market does not care about fairness"?
2 25
Because I am not an economist, I will not answer for the econo-
mists. However, the remaining sections of this Article argue that con-
siderations of fairness should be accounted for explicitly in the
analysis of contract cases, despite the apparent amenability of such
cases to purely economic analysis. This is especially true in cases that
do not involve purely commercial contracts, 2 2 6 and particularly in
cases involving employment contracts. In giving due consideration to
fairness concerns, it is not necessary to forgo entirely the law and eco-
223 POSNER, supra note 49, § 2.3, at 30-31 (emphasis added).
224 See, e.g., William Bratton, Law and Economics of English Only, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973
(1999) (arguing that economic analysis reveals the inefficiency of English-only language
laws).
225 MALLOY, supra note 60, at 32.
226 This is not to say that it is always appropriate to apply an economic analysis to
commercial cases; in such cases, distinct applications of economic and justice-centered ap-
proaches to good faith will not always yield equally equitable results.
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nomics goals of efficiency and wealth maximization. But it is possible
to give primacy in contract disputes to expansive notions of equality
because doing so will lead ultimately to more productive, creative, and
dynamic interactions between contracting parties. 227 More dynamic
interactions will create an expanding network of exchange that, in
turn, will drive and reallocate the formation of wealth and economic
opportunity and effect a more equitable allocation of access to these
exchange processes. The remaining sections of this Article also argue
that conventional antidiscrimination law has not done enough to
combat racial subordination.
IV
CASES INVOLVING GOOD FAITH AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN THE AT-WII.L EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: CRITIQUE
OF THE CASE LAW
This Part develops an expansive equality perspective on the doc-
trine of good faith by analyzing cases arising in the context of at-will
employment agreements. Specifically, the analysis focuses on cases in
which at-will employees attempt to bring claims against their employ-
ers for breach of the implied covenant of good faith under factual
circumstances that also give rise to statutory discrimination claims
under state or federal civil rights legislation. Most courts have held
that the availability of statutory civil rights remedies precludes plain-
tiffs from bringing common law claims for breach of the duty of good
faith based on the same conduct. This Part analyzes the reasoning
behind these decisions from a critical race perspective. It then argues
that the courts have relied too heavily on civil rights law to remedy
cognizable forms of discrimination, and that they have employed the
doctrine of good faith primarily to protect the economic interests of
parties rather than to ensure fairness in the contracting process.
A. The Basics of At-Will Employment
Plaintiffs who bring interconnected discrimination claims and
contractual claims for breach of good faith generally do so in the em-
ployment context, after they have received adverse treatment at the
hands of their employers. 228 These good faith claims are premised on
the contractual nature of the employer-employee relationship, while
227 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text; see also Ian R. MacNeil, Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 525 (surveying the behavioral,
legal, and scholarly dimensions of relational contract law and arguing that acquisition of a
"greater knowledge of essential human social patterns" is required to fully understand dis-
crete contractual exchanges).
228 Plaintiffs have, however, brought breach of good faith and discrimination claims
together in other contexts. See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(termination of distributor agreement); Reid v. Key Bank of S. Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9 (1st
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the discrimination claims are brought as alleged violations of fed-
eral229 or state230 civil rights statutes. Moreover, because these cases
involve at-will employment relationships, courts frequently refuse to
recognize good faith and other common law claims, whether based in
contract or tort,23 1 reasoning that both the employer and the em-
ployee are free to terminate the at-will relationship at any time upon
proper notice, for any reason or for no reason.
232
However, some courts have established narrow, categorical excep-
tions to the at-will employment doctrine. 233 In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hospital, the Supreme Court of Arizona delineated three
general categories of exceptions to the rule that an employer may ter-
minate an at-will employee for any reason or no reason: the public
policy exception, the implied-in-fact employment contract exception,
and the good faith and fair dealing exception.23 4 The public policy
exception dictates that an employer may not terminate an employee
for any reason that would violate "public policy articulated by constitu-
tional, statutory, or decisional law."235 The implied-in-fact employ-
ment contract exception operates to restrict at-will termination in
Cir. 1987) (termination of credit agreement); Woods v. Herman Walldorf & Co., 26 S.W.3d
868 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (commercial leasing).
229 Plaintiffs alleging federal civil rights claims usually bring suit pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000), or § 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (as amended). See, e.g., Byers v. City of Albuquer-
que, 150 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) (Title VII);Jordon v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 958 F.
Supp. 1012 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (Title VII and § 1981).
230 See, e.g., Spellman v. Sec., Annuities & Ins. Servs., Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Ct.
App. 1992).
231 See infra Part IV.B.
232 Many courts acknowledge the general rule that at-will employment is terminable
upon notice for any or no reason, but recognize exceptions to that rule, including an
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 437-38 (Del. 1996); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710
P.2d 1025, 1030-33, 1036-40 (Ariz. 1985), superseded by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501
(West 2002). But see, e.g., Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1396, 1406-07
(N.D. Miss. 1996) (noting that Mississippi law does not recognize an implied obligation of
good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment agreements); Rios v. Tex. Commerce
Bancshares, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 809, 814-16 (Tex. App. 1996) (noting that "neither the
[Texas] legislature nor the supreme court [of Texas] has recognized an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships").
233 See, e.g., Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1030-40. Although Wagenseller was subsequently
superseded by statute, the Supreme Court of Arizona's discussion of the good faith and fair
dealing exception to an at-will employment contract is useful for this Article's analysis.
Moreover, Wagenseller has been cited favorably in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., Martin Mar-
ietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Colo. 1992); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 802
A.2d 482, 488 (Md. 2002).
234 Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1031.
235 Id. at 1031-36 (discussing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1994),
which articulated a public policy/good faith exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine). For an excellent discussion of the public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine, see Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employ-
ment-At-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1583 (1994).
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cases in which the parties' conduct or supplemental statements indi-
cate that the parties have agreed to limit their rights to terminate the
employment relationship. 236 Finally, the good faith and fair dealing
exception establishes "a [contractual] duty imposed by law where the
contract itself is silent,"237 which "requires that neither party do any-
thing that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of
their agreement."2 38 As one might expect from its use of this lan-
guage, the Wagenseller court cited section 205 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts239 at the outset of its discussion of the good faith
exception, and also noted that the good faith duty acts in some juris-
dictions as the basis for a tort claim. 24" The court then summarized
the conflict between jurisdictions that have recognized the good faith
exception to the at-will doctrine and those that have not.241
The Wagenseller court stated, in terms echoing Burton's forgone
opportunities analysis, 242 that the courts that rejected the good faith
exception were motivated primarily by "the concern that to [recog-
nize the exception] would place undue restrictions on management
and would infringe the employer's 'legitimate exercise of manage-
ment discretion. "' 2 4" Although the Wagenseller court did not sustain
the plaintiffs good faith claim in the case before it, the court did not
categorically refuse to recognize good faith claims in the at-will em-
ployment context.244 Instead, the court crafted a good faith excep-
tion modeled on the economic approach to good faith, stating:
We do ... recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment-at-will contract, although that covenant
does not create a duty for the employer to terminate the employee
only for good cause. The covenant does not protect the employee
from a "no cause" termination because tenure was never a benefit
inherent in the at-will agreement. The covenant does protect an
employee from a discharge based on an employer's desire to avoid
the payment of benefits already earned by the employee, such as the
236 See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1036-38. In many cases, the most significant sources of
extrinsic evidence are the employment policy manuals distributed to employees; indeed,
the Wagenseller court referred to the implied-in-fact contract exception as the "personnel
policy manual exception." See id. at 1036.
237 Id. at 1036.
238 Id. at 1038 (citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal.
1958) and Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977)).
239 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopted the excluder analysis model of good
faith. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
240 Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1038; see infra Part IV.B.2.
241 See Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1039-40.
242 See supra Part I.A.1.
243 Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1039 (quoting Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 928 (Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc. 8 P.3d 1089
(Cal. 2000)).
244 See id. at 1040-41.
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sales commissions in Fortune [v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1971)], but not the tenure required to earn the
pension and retirement benefits in Cleary [v. American Airlines, Inc.,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980)]. Thus, plaintiff here has a right
to receive the benefits that were a part of her employment agree-
ment with defendant Hospital. To the extent, however, that the
benefits represent a claim for prospective employment, her claim
must fail. The terminable-at-will contract between her and the Hos-
pital made no promise of continued employment. To the contrary,
it was, by its nature, subject to termination by either party at any
time, subject only to the legal prohibition that she could not be
fired for reasons which contravene public policy.
245
Although the reasoning set forth in the Wagenseller opinion is
both thorough and sensible, and has guided many courts in their anal-
yses of the exceptions to the at-will doctrine, 246 this Article takes issue
with the Wagenseller court's analysis of the public policy exception as
theoretically distinct from the good faith exception. This separation
of the two exceptions is a result of the dominance of the economic
analysis of the doctrine of good faith. 2 47 Contrary to the Wagenseller
court's position, the public policy and good faith exceptions are often
impossible to separate from an analytic perspective. Moreover, in
some circumstances, an expansive equality approach to good faith
consistent with the spirit of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts may
actually necessitate an analysis of the two exceptions as interrelated
phenomena. In order to explicate this point, it is necessary to ex-
amine briefly the law controlling preclusion of common law contract
and tort claims by statutory antidiscrimination remedies.
B. Preclusion of Common Law Contract and Tort Claims by
Antidiscrimination Statutes: The Alternate Remedies
Doctrine
1. Opposing Positions
Although cases in which courts have employed the public policy
exception to limit the at-will employment doctrine usually involve con-
duct that is either "statutorily sanctioned" or "in furtherance of public
policy,"248 it cannot seriously be questioned that federal and state stat-
utory and constitutional prohibitions against discrimination embody
the sort of clearly mandated public policy contemplated by this excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine.249 However, in cases in which plaintiffs
245 Id.
246 See supra note 233.
247 See supra Part I.B.
248 See Pennington, supra note 235, at 1596-1622.
249 See, e.g., Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1225 (Okla. 1992) (holding
that racially motivated discharge or retaliation offends a clear mandate of public policy and
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have brought state common law claims, which may include claims of
contractual or tortious breach of good faith, in conjunction with dis-
crimination claims, courts have divided on the issue of whether the
availability of a statutory civil rights remedy precludes common law
claims and remedies based on the same factual allegations.
Although some commentators and courts have used the language
of "preemption" to describe this controversy, 2511 the use of this term
requires some clarification. Many of the relevant cases involve the
"preemption" of state common law claims by statutory schemes, rather
than the more common issue of preemption of state law claims by
federal law under the Supremacy Clause.25 1 As the Supreme Court of
Kansas explained in Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., this controversy
is more accurately described as one involving the "alternate remedies
doctrine," or as it is sometimes called, "preclusion. -2 5 2 In Fenker, the
employee-plaintiff brought a common law tort action for wrongful dis-
charge, alleging that he had been terminated in retaliation for filing
complaints under the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA), and that the termination violated the public policy excep-
tion to the at-will employment doctrine.25 " After reviewing and com-
paring the remedies available under the relevant section of OSHA and
the state common law tort claim, the Flenker court held that, because
the discretion to bring a retaliatory discharge claim under OSHA lay
solely with the Department and Secretary of Labor, OSHA did not
provide an adequate alternate remedy. 254 Thus, the court refused to
bar the plaintiff's state tort claim for retaliatory wrongful discharge,
on the ground that OSHA provided an inadequate alternate
remedy.255
The F/enker court did assert in dicta, however, that Title VII was
distinguishable from OSHA in that Title VII would preclude a state
common law claim because, unlike OSHA, Title VII gives an aggrieved
person permission to bring a private action in the event that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) refuses to pursue the
constitutes tortious breach of contract); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 590 (Vt. 1986)
(recognizing a "clear and compelling public policy against age discrimination").
250 See, e.g., Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002).
251 See, e.g., Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 990 P.2d 539, 552-53 (Cal. 2000) (hold-
ing that plaintiff's California Fair Employment and Housing Act claim was preempted by
federal statute to the extent that the state and federal statutory schemes conflicted); see also
Kimberly C. Simmons, Annotation, Pre-emption of Wrongful Discharge Cause of Action by Civil
Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994) (surveying case law on preemption of common law
wrongful discharge claims by statutory antidiscrimination statutes).
252 See Flenker v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 967 P.2d 295, 299-300 (Kan. 1998).
253 See id. at 298.
254 See id. at 302-03.
255 See id. at 301-03.
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complaint. 256 In support of this conclusion, the Flenker court cited Pol-
son v. Davis,257 which held that the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination
(KAAD) provided an "adequate and exclusive state remedy for viola-
tions of the public policy enunciated therein," thereby precluding the
plaintiff's state law retaliatory wrongful discharge claim. 258 This Arti-
cle takes issue, from a critical race perspective, with the general pro-
position that the availability of federal or state statutory
antidiscrimination remedies precludes plaintiffs from bringing state
common law claims based on the same allegedly discriminatory
conduct.
The Polson court, in precluding the plaintiffs common law claim,
expressly refused to adopt the reasoning of Wynn v. Boeing Military
Airplane Co., 259 a case that had originated in the same federal district
as Polson.260 In Wynn, the plaintiff sued the Boeing Military Airplane
Co. for employment discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1981,261 which prohibits racial discrimination in the con-
tracting process. 262 In his complaint, Wynn also asserted that Boeing
had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
treating him in a discriminatory manner. 263 Because Kansas recog-
nizes public policy limitations on the at-will employment doctrine,264
and in light of clear public policy against racial discrimination, the
district judge allowed plaintiff to proceed with his breach of good
faith claim, stating that "[ifn absence of a specific contractual provi-
sion, an employer may terminate an employee at will for any reason or
for no reason, but not for a discriminatory reason." 265
Moreover, the court rejected Boeing's argument that the availa-
bility of remedies under federal civil rights statutes precluded Wynn's
assertion of a common law good faith claim, and declined to extend
the holding of Murphy, Tarr v. Riberglass, that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act provides the exclusive remedy for complaints of
age discrimination, into the context of race discrimination law.
2 66
Rather, the court stated that "lt] his Court is unwilling to engraft [an
256 See id. at 303.
257 895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990).
258 Id. at 709-10.
259 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984).
260 See Poison, 895 F.2d at 709-10; see Ridge v. HCA Health Servs. of Kan., Inc., No. 91-
1280-PFK, 1992 WL 363686, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 1992) (declining to follow Wynn in light
of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Poison).
261 See Wynn, 595 F. Supp. at 728.
262 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
263 See Wynn, 595 F. Supp. at 728-29.
264 Id. at 729 (citing Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs.,
630 P.2d 186, 192 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)).
265 Id. at 728-29.




exclusive remedy provision] onto the law of race discrimination. '" 267
Addressing more squarely the issue of whether the federal civil rights
statutes provided plaintiff an adequate alternate remedy, the court as-
serted that Wynn's good faith claim was not coterminous with his fed-
eral statutory remedies, noting that even the Kansas statutory scheme
differed from federal antidiscrimination law.268 Thus, the court re-
fused "to make § 1981 and Title VII plaintiffs exclusive avenues of
relief. "269
The Wynn court's recognition of two important but ostensibly ob-
vious points reveals a critical understanding of the nature of racial
subordination. First, the court acknowledged explicitly that Wynn's
good faith claim was directly related to a public policy against discrim-
ination because Boeing's alleged failure to act in good faith arose out
of the same set of facts that gave rise to his potential discrimination
claims.270 As the court implied, however, this is not to say that the two
claims are equivalent; each may require a distinct legal analysis of the
facts and provide remedies of a different nature.271 Second, in refus-
ing to engraft an exclusive remedy provision into the federal law of
race discrimination, the Wynn court recognized implicitly the limita-
tions of federal civil rights remedies, as well as the onerous burden
plaintiffs must carry in such cases, when it refused to recognize federal
claims as the exclusive remedies for unlawful racial discrimination.
272
The problem with making federal civil rights statutes a plaintiff's ex-
clusive remedy is that such relief is difficult to obtain.273 Under statu-
tory antidiscrimination law, the defendant's mere articulation of a
legitimate business reason for the plaintiffs termination requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's reasons are a mere pre-
text for discrimination, 274 a rather difficult task.
Thus, a critical reading of the Wynn court's opinion transforms
theoretical critiques of conventional civil rights jurisprudence into
practice. The opinion addresses the need for broader remedies




270 See id. at 729-30 ("Wynn's case fits squarely within the ambit of Murphy [v. City of
Topeka-Shawnee County Department of Labor Services, 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)]: a
discharge based on the impermissible consideration of race is prohibited by the public
policy of Kansas.").
271 See id. at 729; supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
272 See Wynn, 595 F. Supp. at 729 ("The Kansas common law action may provide reme-
dies not available under federal law and does not have requisites that the federal law
possesses.").
273 See, e.g., supra note 211 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame-
work in Title VII cases).
274 See supra note 211.
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effectively with the material conditions of racial subordination by ex-
panding the scope of the implied duty of good faith in the at-will em-
ployment relationship. A critical reading of the opinion also reveals
an implicit recognition of the perpetrator-victim critique of civil rights
jurisprudence, and begins to address the broader social problem of
racial subordination through the expansion of the efficiency-modeled
"perfect contracting world." The Wynn decision thus opens the door
to an expansive equality approach to the doctrine of good faith.
Although the Wynn court's holding was rejected by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Poison,275 and has not been widely followed, its significant inter-
vention in the development of both good faith and at-will
employment jurisprudence has support in other jurisdictions.276 Yet,
even in cases in which courts follow the Wynn approach, the implied
duty of good faith is still used primarily as an instrument to effect
efficiency.27 7 In order to develop the expansive equality perspective,
the next section examines two analogous cases consistent with Wynn.
2. Analogous Positive Cases: Rojo and Tate
a. California: Rojo v. Kliger
In Rojo v. Kliger,278 the Supreme Court of California held that the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),279 California's
antidiscrimination statute, did not preclude state common law claims
relating to employment discrimination. 280 The Rojo plaintiffs, Emma
Rojo and Teresa Maloney, who were former medical assistants to the
defendant Dr. Erwin Kliger, alleged that they were compelled to leave
their employment due to Dr. Kliger's "sexually harassing remarks and
demands for sexual favors." 21l Subsequently, Rojo and Maloney sued
Dr. Kliger and his medical corporation, asserting statutory claims for
sexual harassment in violation of FEHA, as well as common law tort
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful
discharge in contravention of public policy. 28 2 Although Rojo involved
allegations of discrimination based on sex as opposed to race, and the
plaintiffs did not allege a breach of the duty of good faith, the court's
reasoning is instructive for purposes of this Article, because it can be
275 See Poison v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705, 709-10 (10th Cir. 1990).
276 See, e.g., Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); High v.
Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
277 See supra Part I.B.
278 801 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1990).
279 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003).
280 See Rojo, 801 P.2d at 376-83. The court also addressed the related issue of whether
the employees were required to exhaust the administrative process under the FEHA before
bringing common law causes of action, The court answered this question negatively. See
id. at 383-88, However, the court's analysis of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.




used to address more broadly the elimination of other forms of iden-
tity-group based subordination.283
The inconsistency of California's lower courts on the particular
issue of whether the FEHA precluded common law claims, such as
those of the Rojo plaintiffs, was reflected in the procedural history of
the case itself. The trial court granted Dr. Kliger summary judgment
based in part on the exclusive alternate remedy doctrine and the
FEHA's preclusion of state common law claims, 284 but the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the FEHA did not preempt or pre-
clude the common law claims that were related to the employment
discrimination facts. 285 Affirming the Court of Appeals, the California
Supreme Court in Rojo relied primarily on the language of the FEHA
itself:
"The provisions of this part shall be construed liberally for the ac-
complishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing contained in this
part shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the Civil
Rights Law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination
because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age."
As we explained in State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Hous-
ing Commn.... : "The FEHA was meant to supplement, not sup-
plant or be supplanted by, existing antidiscrimination remedies, in
order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate
their civil rights against discrimination ...."
By expressly disclaiming a purpose to repeal other applicable
state laws .... we believe the Legislature has manifested an intent to
amplify, not abrogate, an employee's common law remedies for in-
juries relating to employment discrimination. Had the Legislature
intended otherwise, it plainly knew how to do SO.286
Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he meaning of the FEHA is
clear .... [T]he FEHA ... expressly disclaims any intent to repeal
other applicable state laws." 28 7 Moreover, the common law of Califor-
nia "provides any number of remedial theories to compensate for in-
juries 'relating to discrimination,"' 288 and a failure to bring such
28"3 For discussions on group identity and identity formation, see Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000) (hereinafter Carbado & Gulati,
Working Identity]. Carbado and Gulati's work explores how cultural expectations and con-
structs of performative identity in the workplace, in turn based on stereotypes and racial or
sexual scripting, impact employment discrimination discourse.
284 See Rojo, 801 P.2d at 375.
285 See id. at 375-76.
286 Id. at 377-78 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1992) (emphasis added)
and State Pers. Bd. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm 'n, 703 P.2d 354, 359 (Cal. 1985)).
287 Id. at 377, 383.
288 Id. at 377 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (emphasis added)).
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related claims, such as Rojo's and Maloney's emotional distress and
tortious discharge claims, would reflect the irresponsibility and inept-
ness of the attorney handling such a case.289
One of the defendant's particular arguments deserves a more de-
tailed discussion, because the court's response to that argument is rel-
evant to the analysis of the exclusive alternate remedies doctrine
discussed earlier in this Article.2 90 Kliger argued that the "new fight-
exclusive remedy" rule of statutory construction and the "preexisting
right-cumulative remedies" doctrine supported the inference that the
California legislature intended in enacting the FEHA to cover the en-
tire field of employment discrimination. 291 The new fight-exclusive
remedy rule requires that "where a statute creates a right that did not
exist at common law and provides a comprehensive and detailed re-
medial scheme for its enforcement, the statutory remedy is exclu-
sive." 292  In contrast, the preexisting fight-cumulative remedies
doctrine dictates that "where a statutory remedy is provided for a pre-
existing common law right, the newer remedy is generally considered
to be cumulative, and the older remedy may be pursued at the plain-
tiffs election."2
9 3
In its first line of reasoning, the court summarily dismissed the
applicability of these constructive doctrines, because "the pertinent
language of the FEHA is plain and its meaning unmistakable: the act
expressly disclaims any intent to repeal other state laws relating to dis-
crimination, legislative or otherwise." 29 4 The court then went on to
attack the defendant's argument on its merits, criticizing the defen-
dant's misapplication of the doctrines. The court held that the cor-
rect application of the doctrines simply established that the scope of
the FEHA was limited to the categories expressly enumerated in its
provisions, thus barring discrimination only on those specified
289 Id. Kliger advanced additional interpretive challenges to the continued validity of
common law claims in light of the provisions of the FEHA, but the Rojo court remained
unpersuaded. See id. at 378 (rejecting defendant's argument that use of the term "repeal"
in section 12993(a) of the FEHA revealed legislative intent to preserve only statutory, not
common law, remedial theories); id. at 378-81 (rejecting defendant's argument that the
statement in section 12993(c) of the California Legislature's intent to "occupy the field of
regulation of discrimination in employment" expressed an intent to supersede all preexist-
ing state law except for a particular civil code section referenced in section 12993(c)).
290 See supra Part IV.B.1.
291 Rojo, 801 P.2d at 381.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. The court further criticized Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co., 194 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct.
App. 1983), and its progeny for "needlessly" applying the new right-exclusive remedy rule
of interpretation to the FEHA to preclude common law wrongful discharge claims in viola-
tion of public policy, in light of the FEHA's express disclaimer of any intent to preclude
other state law claims. Rojo, 801 P.2d at 383.
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grounds.295 In support of this holding, the court noted that "we have
long recognized that the common law provides a variety of means in-
dependent of the FEHA ... to redress injuries arising from discrimi-
nation in employment."
296
Although the Rojo court's opinion bolsters this Article's position
that federal and state antidiscrimination statutes do not and should
not preclude common law claims based on related facts, the Rojo opin-
ion's almost singular reliance on statutory interpretation of the FEHA
reveals a reluctance, either conscious or unconscious, to confront a
harder question: Why do plaintiffs need access to multiple theories of
redress if civil rights statutes provide specific remedies for discrimina-
tion? As suggested above, plaintiffs need this access because of the
way legal and nonlegal actors have come to conceptualize discrimina-
tion as singularly egregious acts of racism perpetrated by bad actors
who intend to inflict the subordinating consequences of their actions,
rather than as a set of systemic conditions of subordination.
297
The Rojo court's 1990 decision that the FEHA does not bar re-
lated common law claims has since been extended to discrimination
based on race 298 and age. 299 Moreover, other states, such as
Oklahoma, have followed California's lead in this regard.
b. Oklahoma: Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.
In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 30 0 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
addressed the following question certified by the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma:
"Where an at-will employee terminated by a private employer
files suit alleging facts that, if true, violate state and federal statutes
providing remedies for employment discrimination, can the em-
ployee-plaintiff state a tort cause of action based on the same facts,
pursuant to the public policy exception to the at-will termination
rule, recently recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Burk
v. K-Mart, 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989)?"31
The Tate court answered this question in the affirmative, "noting that
the federal statute violated does not preempt state law and holding
295 See Rojo, 801 P.2d at 381.
296 Id.
297 See supra Part III.A.
298 See, e.g., Carmichael v. Alfano Temp. Pers., 285 Cal. Rptr. 143 (Ct. App. 1991).
299 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157 (Cal. 1997).
300 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992).
301 Id. at 1220. In Burk, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma adopted the public policy
tort exception to the at-will-employment termination rule. 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla. 1989).
The Burk court noted that although it refused to impose an implied covenant of good faith
on an employer's decision to terminate, id. at 27, recognition of the public policy tort
exception served "to accommodate the competing interests of society, the employee and
the employer," id. at 28.
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that the applicable state statute neither explicitly nor implicitly pro-
vides an exclusive remedy for employment-related discrimination." 30 2
The plaintiff in Tate, a Black male, had been employed at Brown-
ing-Ferris, Inc. as a driver, but was demoted to "driver's helper," alleg-
edly so that a less qualified and less senior White employee could be
promoted to Tate's driver position. 30 3 Tate also alleged that he had
been subjected to harassment and intimidation while employed at
Browning-Ferris, and he filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC,
charging Browning-Ferris with discrimination against Black males.3 04
Tate was later terminated, and he subsequently filed another EEOC
complaint charging Browning-Ferris with racially motivated wrongful
discharge in retaliation for the filing of the first EEOC complaint. 30 5
When the EEOC issued Tate a right-to-sue letter, he brought an action
in federal court against Browning-Ferris, asserting violations of Title
VII in addition to state tort claims for wrongful discharge in contra-
vention of public policy.30 6
The Tate court first addressed the preliminary question of
whether Oklahoma's antidiscrimination statute is preempted by Title
VII, which provides that "state laws will be preempted only if they actu-
ally conflict with federal law."30 7 Concluding that Title VII does not pre-
empt Oklahoma's employment discrimination laws, the court noted
two well-settled principles established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra.308 First, the Tate
court referenced the Supreme Court's interpretation in Guerra of Ti-
tle VII's limited preemption provisions as "explicit disclaimers of any
federal intent categorically to preempt state law or to 'occupy the
field' of employment discrimination. '" 30 9 Second, the Tate court noted
that, under Guerra, Title VII acts as a floor, rather than as a ceiling,
with respect to the scope of protection that may be provided by fed-
eral or state antidiscrimination law.31 0 Moreover, the court noted
Tate's own assertions about the inadequacy of both Title VII and
Oklahoma's statutes as remedies for racial discrimination: these statu-
tory schemes, Tate claimed, not only failed to make him whole, they
also failed to deter discriminatory practices. 3 1
302 Tate, 833 P.2d at 1220 (emphasis omitted).
303 Id. at 1221 n.9.
304 Id. at 1221 & n.9.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 1222 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7, 2000h-4 (2000)).
308 Id. at 1122-23 & nn.13-14 (citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 281, 285 (1987)).
309 Id. at 1222 & n.13 (quoting Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281).
310 Id. at 1222-23 & 1223 n.14 (citing Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285).
311 See id. at 1223.
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Returning to the more relevant question of whether the state an-
tidiscrimination statutes precluded plaintiffs from bringing tortious
wrongful discharge claims based on racially motivated discrimination,
the Tate court acknowledged that the courts of various states were di-
vided on this issue.3 12 Some states simply precluded state common
law claims based on statutory exclusive remedy theories. 313 Others re-
fused to preclude all state claims, but, employing narrow applications
of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, lim-
ited the availability of common law tort actions to those circumstances
in which wrongful discharges in contravention of public policy "would
otherwise go unvindicated by a civil remedy. '314 Still other courts
held that state common law claims supplemented rather than sup-
planted the goals of antidiscrimination statutes, reasoning that "the
common-law tort action's availability may deter future discrimination
and combat entrenched existing illegal employment practices."
315
The Tate court ultimately followed the approach of this third cat-
egory of cases, holding that the Oklahoma antidiscrimination statute
did not preclude Tate from asserting a claim for tortious wrongful
discharge in violation of the public policy against racial discrimina-
tion, or for unlawful retaliation in response to a racial discrimination
complaint. 316 As the California Supreme Court did in Rojo, the Tate
court applied conventional canons of statutory interpretation to sup-
port its conclusion, noting in particular that the Oklahoma statute was
"to be construed liberally to further its general purposes." 317 Further,
the court expressly rejected the argument that, by enacting the
Oklahoma statute, the legislature had intended the statute to occupy
the entire field of not only employment discrimination, but also all
employer/employee regulations:
That conclusion would be far from sound. Regulation of discrimi-
nation lies in many legal domains. Since the Act's purpose places it
in pari materia with Title VII, which was not meant to be the sole source
of redress for employment discrimination, a reasonable construction
would be that the remedies provided by our Act are not exclusive.
There is nothing in the Act to indicate a legislative intent to even
enter, much less completely occupy, the entire arena of legally regu-
lated employer/employee relationship.
3 18
312 See id. at 1223 n.21.
313 Id.; see supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
314 Tate, 833 P.2d at 1223 n.21.
315 Id. Notably, among the cases the Tate court cited for this proposition is Wagenseller
v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), superseded by ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 23-1501 (West 2002). See supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text (discussing
Wagenseller).
316 Tate, 833 P.2d at 1230-31.
317 Id. at 1228 & n.54.
318 Id. at 1229 (footnote omitted).
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Finally, the Tate court invoked the Oklahoma Constitution's mandate
against "dichotomous division of discrimination remedies."319
c. Tying Up Rojo and Tate
The Rojo and Tate courts reached a desirable conclusion by refus-
ing to construe state or federal antidiscrimination claims as preclud-
ing or preempting state common law claims of wrongful discharge in
contravention of a public policy against discrimination. Moreover, al-
though both Rojo and Tate presented a solid first line of reasoning
guided by the language of the statutes themselves and rooted in the
application of well-established canons of statutory interpretation, the
Tate court's reasoning is more consistent with the theoretical ap-
proach advocated in this Article.
First, in a turn consistent with the critical race critique of antidis-
crimination statutes, the Tate court (like the Wynn court before it320)
explicitly recognized Tate's assertions that the remedies provided by
antidiscrimination statutes were inadequate to provide the relief
sought, assertions that can be read to express a dissatisfaction with the
traditional perpetrator perspective of conventional civil rights juris-
prudence. 21 Although the Tate court did not explicitly adopt or ex-
trapolate broader principles from Tate's assertions, the court's early
reference to them arguably implies that Tate's assertions-those of
the "victim" in the language of Freeman 3 22-had some impact on the
court's analysis and decision.
The Tate court also expressly stated that the regulation of discrim-
ination lay in "many legal domains."323 This statement is significant
not only because it potentially broadens the conventional legal under-
standing of discrimination as a function of particular egregious acts or
conduct, but also because it recognizes the complex ways in which
systemic conditions of subordination manifest themselves in the work-
place. An employee may not be able to point to a single actionable
incident of blatant discrimination, such as the pervasive use of humili-
ating racial epithets in his presence or the expressed refusal to pro-
mote him because of his race, but that will not diminish the inequality
of his situation. He understands, for example, that he will be held to
an implicitly higher standard in the review process relative to other,
similarly situated White employees; that his work will be scrutinized
much more carefully and critically than that of his White counter-
319 Id. at 1229-30 & 1230 n.65 (emphasis omitted) (citing OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 46).
320 See supra notes 259-76 and accompanying text (discussing Wynn v. Boeing Military
Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984)).
321 See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
323 Tate, 833 P.2d at 1229.
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parts; and that he will have to calculate more scrupulously the risk of
his work-related decisions because of this enhanced scrutiny, while his
White colleagues will have given similar decisions little or no
thought.3 24 The psychic, emotional, intellectual, and professional
tolls that attach to these kinds of precautionary practices in the work-
place are severely burdensome, yet they are generally ignored by an-
tidiscrimination law.3 2 5 The significance of the Tate court's reasoning
is that, although it makes no explicit reference to these issues, it seems
to recognize implicitly that discrimination, from a victim's perspective,
involves much more than conventional civil rights law contemplates.
Thus, other remedies must remain available to plaintiffs.
The contours of those other remedies, however, were limited in
both Rojo and Tate to tortious wrongful discharge claims, and did not
extend to contractual claims for breach of the duty of good faith. In
Bakken v. North-American Coal Corp.3 26 and Bennett v. Beiersdorf, Inc.,
however,3 27 federal courts in the districts of North Dakota and Con-
necticut, each applying the law of its respective state, expressly stated
that public policies against discrimination based on gender or race
cannot support an at-will employee's claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Similarly, the Supreme Court
of California in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. has expressly limited the
use of good faith claims to combat age discrimination in the at-will
employment context.
328
3. Analogous Negative Cases: Contractual Good Faith Claims
a. Bakken v. North American Coal Corp.
The Bakken case, although not involving racial discrimination, is
an analogous sex discrimination case. The plaintiff brought an action
against her former employer alleging sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and bad faith sufficient tojustify an award of punitive damages. 329
Bakken began working as a secretary for North American Coal in Feb-
ruary 1977. 330 Over the next two years she received salary increases,
and was promoted to the position of technical assistant in October
1979._331 A few months later, her title was changed to research techni-
cian, and she continued to receive steady and substantial raises over
324 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 283, at 1263-66, 1279-98.
325 See id. at 1276-98.
426 See 641 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (D.N.D. 1986).
327 See 889 F. Supp. 46, 49 (D. Conn. 1995).
328 See8 P.3d 1089, 1109-12 (Cal. 2000).
329 Bakken, 641 F. Supp. at 1017.




the next few years. 332 Bakken filed a sex discrimination suit against
North American Coal alleging that her salary was less than that of a
male employee in her department, even though theirjob responsibili-
ties were essentially the same. 333 In addition, she alleged that, al-
though she submitted a request for a transfer to Cleveland when her
department was relocated, she was denied the opportunity to transfer
because North American Coal's president disliked women and had
instructed Bakken's supervisors to discourage her from transfer-
ring.3 34 Bakken sought another position with North American Coal in
Cleveland, but another woman was hired for that position. 335 Bakken
then filed a complaint with the North Dakota Department of Labor
alleging sex discrimination.3 36 Shortly thereafter, Bakken's supervi-
sors informed her that her position as research technician was to be
eliminated when her department moved to Cleveland.337 She was sub-
sequently offered another, apparently lesser position at North Ameri-
can Coal as a secretary and keypunch operator; however, she declined
the offer.338 At the time she was offered this position, one of her su-
pervisors told her that she would not receive her promised severance
pay unless she agreed to abandon her claim with the Department of
Labor.339
The court sustained Bakken's Title VII sex discrimination claim
and her contractual good faith claim, but dismissed the claim for pu-
nitive damages under both the Title VII and the contractual good
faith theories.340 Because North Dakota had not yet recognized an
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith in the context
of at-will employment, the court first determined that the Supreme
Court of North Dakota would recognize such an action only if the
covenant is implied in fact in an employment arrangement. 341 The
court then held that Bakken had presented genuine issues of material
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 See id. at 1016-17.





340 See id. at 1018-19, 1022-23. The court asserted that North Dakota would recognize
the implied covenant of good faith only as an implied-in-fact contract term, not as a term
implied in law. Id. at 1022. Thus, although the court refused to grant summary judgment
against Bakken on this claim, it noted that she would ultimately need to support this claim
with proof of representations by North American Coal sufficient to establish an implied-in-
fact duty of good faith. See id. at 1022-23.
341 Id. at 1020, 1022. However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota later rejected the
Bakken court's analysis and held that at-will employment contracts do not contain an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Hillesland v. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n, 407
N.W.2d 206, 211-15 (N.D. 1987).
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fact regarding whether North American Coal had, through its con-
duct, objectively manifested to Bakken that "she had job security and
would be treated fairly.
'3 42
Significantly, however, the court also suggested that a contractual
good faith claim, as opposed to a tort claim alleging violation of pub-
lic policy, "cannot rest solely on an alleged violation of a public policy
against discrimination. '34 " The court discussed the exclusive alternate
remedy doctrine, stating that
[m]ost courts that have considered the question have held that the
presence of a statutory remedy for violation of an anti-discrimina-
tion statute precludes a common law action based on violation of a
public policy against discrimination. Those courts have generally
held that the remedy scheme provided in an anti-discrimination
statute is intended to define the exclusive remedy against discrimi-
nation. Other considerations include use of a public policy excep-
tion to circumvent an anti-discrimination statute's procedural and
remedial limitations.
3 44
Thus, the Bakken court refused to permit contractual good faith claims
to rest solely on alleged violations of public policy, and seems to have
condemned implicitly such claims as attempts to circumvent conven-
tional civil rights law.
b. Bennett v. Beiersdorf, Inc.
The plaintiff in Bennett, an African American woman, sued her
former employer and supervisor, asserting state law claims for breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contract, as well as
a Title VII claim alleging discrimination on the basis of race.3 45 Be-
cause her good faith claim was factually related to the Title VII claim,
Bennett argued that, under Connecticut law, the defendants had
breached the covenant of good faith in violation of a clearly mandated
public policy prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
race. 346 Despite the public policy against discrimination, the court
dismissed Bennett's good faith claim.
[I] t is not sufficient simply to point to an important public policy-
a plaintiff bringing a claim for violation of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing must also establish that she does not otherwise have an adequate
means of vindicating that public policy. For example, the public policy
against age discrimination in employment cannot justify a claim
based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because there
342 Bakken, 641 F. Supp. at 1022-23.
343 See id. at 1023.
344 Id. (citation omitted).
-345 See 889 F. Supp. 46, 48-49, 51 (D. Conn. 1995).
346 See id. at 49.
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are already sufficient statutory remedies. As with age discrimina-
tion, the statutory remedies for race discrimination in employment
are sufficiently well developed to preclude an independent cause of
action. Indeed, plaintiff's complaint alleges violations of both state
and federal statutes dealing with race discrimination in employ-
ment. Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to the [good
faith claim], with prejudice.
3 4 7
Aside from providing, in essence, a restatement of the exclusive alter-
nate remedy doctrine, the Bennett court offered no reasoning in sup-
port of its dismissal of Bennett's good faith claim.
c. A Special Case: Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of California in Guz v. Bech-
tel National, Inc. 3 4 8 is only tenuously related to that used by the Bakken
and Bennett courts to bar contractual good faith claims. Yet it warrants
discussion because the Supreme Court of California's decision in Guz
began to limit the erosion of the at-will employment doctrine by ex-
pressly barring independent recovery for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of the alleged violation
of a clear public policy against age discrimination. 349
Guz, a twenty-two year employee of Bechtel National, Inc., was
terminated at the age of forty-nine, when his work unit was eliminated
and its responsibilities reassigned.to another Bechtel office. 350 Guz
was originally hired as an administrative assistant in 1971 and he re-
ceived numerous raises and promotions over the next two decades.
351
At the time of his discharge, he was the financial reports supervisor for
Bechtel's in-house management information unit.352 In 1992, a new
president of Bechtel became dissatisfied with the inefficient perform-
ance of Guz's work unit.3 53 After considering different proposed busi-
ness and budget plans, the new president decided to transfer the
unit's work responsibilities to a similar work group in one of Bechtel's
regional offices.35 4 Bechtel retained and transferred only the two
youngest employees of Guz's unit to the regional office, while Guz
and the other older employees were laid off, and their responsibilities
347 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
348 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
349 The Guz case abrogated, in part, the California appellate court's decision in Walker
v. Blue Cross, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Ct. App. 1992), a case in which the court permitted
plaintiff to bring an action alleging a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that was related to the plaintiff's FEHA claims for race, sex, and
physical handicap discrimination. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1111-12.
350 Guz, 8 P.3d at 1095-96.
351 Id. at 1095.
352 Id.
353 See id. at 1096.
354 See id. at 1096-97.
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assumed by current employees at the regional office.355 Guz was laid
off and placed on temporary holding status for six months, pending
possible reassignment to another position at Bechtel.3 56 During that
time, three other positions became available in the group that as-
sumed Guz's duties, but they were filled by other employees aged
forty-two, fifty-two, and thirty-eight.3 57 Guz obtained no other position
with Bechtel during those six months, and Bechtel subsequently ter-
minated his employment.3 58
Following his termination, Guz sued Bechtel, asserting claims of
age discrimination in violation of the FEHA, breach of an implied
contract to be terminated only for good cause, and breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 359 Guz's good faith
claim was based solely on his allegations that, assuming the employ-
ment relationship had been at-will, Bechtel violated its own personnel
policies when it terminated him without giving him an opportunity to
improve his performance, failed to use objective criteria when select-
ing him for layoff, and failed to consider him for other open positions
for which he was qualified. 361° In essence, Guz argued implicitly that
Bechtel violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by refusing to use objective criteria-other than age-in evaluating
him as a candidate for layoffs and for other positions with Bechtel.
The Supreme Court of California flatly rejected the availability of
a good faith claim under these circumstances, not on preemption
grounds, but because Guz had attempted to use the duty of good faith
to "impose substantive terms and conditions beyond those to which
the contract parties actually agreed. ' ' 36' The court further explained
that:
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every
contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from un-
fairly frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits of the
agreement actually made. The covenant thus cannot "'be endowed
with an existence independent of its contractual underpinnings."'
It cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting par-
ties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their
agreement.
355 Id. at 1097.
356 Id.
357 Id. Apparently, Guz conceded in the course of the litigation that he never specifi-
cally applied for these positions, but he insisted that he had made it known that he wanted
to stay at Bechtel. Id.
358 Id.
359 Id. at 1094, 1112.
360 Id. at 1109-10.
361 ld. at 1110.
1084 [Vol. 88:1025
CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS
... Precisely because employment at will allows the employer
freedom to terminate the relationship as it chooses, the employer
does not frustrate the employee's contractual rights merely by doing
SO.
3 6 2
Thus, the court retreated to a more rigid application of the at-will
employment doctrine and rejected categorically the good faith excep-
tion to the at-will termination rule.
The Guz court's reasoning, however, is more persuasive than that
of the Bakken and Bennett courts in reaching similar results, because
Guz's good faith allegations pointed to certain termination proce-
dures to which he and Bechtel had not agreed.363 If Guz had explicitly
alleged that Bechtel had inappropriately considered his age in refus-
ing to reassign him to other positions and in selecting him for layoff,
would the result have been different? Perhaps so, in light of Rojo.-
3 64
d. Critique of the Negative Cases
It is unclear whether Guz could have saved his good faith claim by
alleging explicitly that Bechtel's negative employment actions were
motivated by improper consideration of Guz's age. Such allegations,
however, were at least implicit in his charge that Bechtel failed to use
objective criteria in its decision making. Nonetheless, the discussion
of good faith in Guz focused narrowly on the conditions to which the
parties agreed,365 despite, or perhaps because of, California's adop-
tion of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts approach to good faith.36 6
Such a narrow approach may be attributable to the California courts'
concerns that the doctrine of good faith leads to the theoretical con-
flation of contract and tort.367 Indeed, the doctrine of good faith
raises concerns that implicate Grant Gilmore's infamous prediction
regarding the "death of contract" by its absorption into tort law.
368
This Article, however, takes issue with contractual conceptions of
good faith, because traditional economic analysis is pervasive in con-
tract theory. Thus, the dominant conception of good faith in contract
law derives almost exclusively from economic analysis. 369 However,
because a system of effective private agreements is critical to the pro-
362 Id. (citations omitted).
363 See id. at 1109-10 (describing Guz's allegations that Bechtel failed to follow its own
personnel policies); supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
364 See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
365 See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1109-10.
366 See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-90 (Cal. 1988) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).
367 See, e.g., id. at 393-94.
368 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-112 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
1974) (arguing that the law of contracts is collapsing into the law of torts). The broader
theoretical question raised by Gilmore's book is beyond the scope of this Article.
369 See supra Part I.B.
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cess of wealth formation, Malloy's law and market economy theory
plays a crucial role in this Article's analysis. Malloy's theory asserts
that wealth formation depends at least as much upon creativity, dis-
covery, and social responsibility as it does upon efficiency.
3v
The narrow economic approach to the good faith exception
makes sense in the context of a categorical analysis of exceptions to
the at-will employment doctrine.3 7' This compartmentalization of the
exceptions directs courts to separate completely the questions of what
constitutes good faith and what constitutes public policy.3 72 Yet, if the
duty of good faith reflects "community standards of decency, fairness
or reasonableness," 373 and public policy also reflects social concep-
tions of fairness and equity, why should these two aspects of the con-
tractual employment relationship be separated in theory or doctrine?
The separation of good faith and public policy derives from the domi-
nance of economic analysis of contract law and the courts' use of the
doctrine of good faith to advance purely economic analyses. That is,
in cases in which courts use the excluder analysis of good faith to
bring about efficiency 374 and define the duty of good faith as one that
"exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrat-
ing the other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually
made, ' 3 75 they dilute the duty's primary equitable purpose: to serve the
ends of justice3 76 in a way that reflects "community standards of de-
cency, fairness or reasonableness. ' 377 This Article challenges that
practice and advocates an expansive equality approach to the doctrine
of good faith, an approach that takes into account independent no-
tions of justice and fairness.
The reasoning of courts holding that good faith claims are pre-
cluded by state or federal antidiscrimination statutes378 is problematic
because it ignores the difference in remedy available under different
theories of recovery simply because the respective claims are based on
370 See supra Part II.
371 This categorical analysis can be seen, for example, in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memo-
rial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), superseded by ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (West
2002). See supra notes 233-46 (discussing Wagenseller).
372 This Article addresses the good faith exception (rather than the public policy ex-
ception) because of its broad applicability to other aspects of contract law. Moreover, the
at-will employment context seems to be the most obvious starting point for advocating an
expansive equality approach to the duty of good faith because good faith claims in this
context are inextricably related to discrimination claims. Thus, the at-will employment
context enables both a critique of antidiscrimination law and an integrative proposal for
confronting racial subordination.
373 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 205 cmt. a (1981); see supra Part I.A.
374 See supra Part i.B.3.
375 Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (Cal. 2000).
376 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
377 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
378 See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.3.a-b (discussing the Bakken and Barrett cases).
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the same set of facts. In many cases, however, it is the lawyer's obliga-
tion to present multiple theories of recovery. Moreover, the remedies
provided by breach of good faith claims and discrimination claims
are, as the Wynn court recognized implicitly,3 79 often dramatically dif-
ferent, as are the respective burdens a plaintiff must carry in order to
prevail.380 The substantive and procedural limitations on civil rights
remedies drive the need for an expansive equality approach to good
faith.
As discussed above, the plaintiffs burden in proving a civil rights
claim can be quite onerous.3 8' For instance, the defendant in a Title
VII case can rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case merely by articulat-
ing a legitimate business reason for the challenged employment ac-
tion, and the plaintiff faces significant difficulties in demonstrating
that the articulated justification is purely pretextual.38 2 The Title VII
burden-shifting framework exemplifies Freeman's perpetrator-victim
critique 38 3 of antidiscrimination law. By forcing the plaintiff to carry
such a heavy burden, the framework presumes that conditions of ra-
cial subordination no longer exist. In short, the framework privileges
the alleged perpetrators' construct of reality over that of the victims.
Perpetrators and victims perceive reality very differently, and this dif-
ference in perception is the red flag of continued racial inequality.
38 4
This Article does not suggest that antidiscrimination statutes are
unnecessary or should be repealed, or that we as a society are not
indebted to past and current civil rights struggles. Our civil rights
must, of course, receive continued protection, and civil rights laws
have at the very least attempted to eliminate direct and overt forms of
discrimination in the workplace. 38 5 However, this Article identifies
ways in which the law should strengthen its assault against racial sub-
ordination, in light of the inherent limitations of current civil rights
laws. That body of law does not reckon with the pervasiveness of un-
conscious racism, which is essential to the reproduction of conditions
of subordination.
The solution to this problem is not to import the Title VII stan-
dard into an analysis of contractual good faith claims. Such a propo-
sal would simply embed the existing perpetrator perspective into the
doctrine of good faith. It is beyond the scope of this Article to formu-
379 See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
380 See, e.g., supra note 211 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame-
work in Title VII cases).
381 See supra note 211.
382 See supra note 211.
383 See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
384 Feagin and Sikes have also observed conditions of racial inequality in the modern
sociocultural landscape. See FE.AGIN & SIES, supra note 208, at vi-x, 15-18.
385 See supra Part III.A.1.
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late legal standards or bright-line rules establishing what conduct con-
stitutes good faith or bad faith. However, in analyzing the meaning of
good faith and fair dealing, courts should be permitted to take into
account plailitiffs' perceptions of racial prejudice and the conditions
of racial subordination. Such a shift in focus is necessary not only
because society should be committed to the elimination of racial sub-
ordination, but also because the ways in which we "do business" will be
affected positively by social equality and responsibility. 38 6 If the doc-
trine of good faith functions to produce the conditions of a perfect
contracting environment, 3 7 why should it be concerned solely with
ensuring the most efficient conditions, when exchange transactions
and wealth formation are driven more by creativity and discovery than
by efficiency?
388
The current models of the doctrine of good faith 38 9 require re-
construction. These models exist in part because of the legal com-
partmentalization of remedies for racial subordination into the realm
of antidiscrimination jurisprudence, which constructs civil rights law,
inaccurately, as the exclusive and adequate solution to problems of
subordination. Accordingly, courts are generally unwilling to con-
sider race in other substantive areas of law, such as contract. Permit-
ting considerations of race in contract law will not eliminate the
pervasiveness of the perpetrator perspective in antidiscrimination
law,3 90 restricted notions of equality,3 9 1 or conditions of unconscious
racism.3 9 2 An expansive equality approach to the doctrine of good
faith, however, uses good faith in an attempt to construct a con-
tracting environment that reflects a societal commitment to ending
subordination.
3186 This is so because, as Malloy has noted, "[1]egal and market institutions ... vary
with reference to the cultural-interpretive framework in which they operate." ROBIN PAUL
MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO USING MARKET CONCEPTS IN
LEGAL REASONING (forthcoming Dec. 2003) (manuscript at 14, on file with author). In
turn, those cultural-interpretive frameworks, themselves informed by factors such as race,
gender, and class, are "used to shape markets, to segment markets, and to discriminate
within and between markets." Id. (manuscript at 14-15). By understanding and applying
Malloy's interpretive law and market economy approach, see supra Part II, "successful mar-
ket economies can be understood as being facilitated by legal institutions that promote a
concern for others-for third parties and for a public interest that is not always advanced
by the fragmented pursuit of self-interest," MALLOY, supra (manuscript at 15).
387 See supra Part I.B.3.
388 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
3 89 See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.3.a-c (discussing Bakken, Barrett, and Guz).
390 See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
'491 See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.




THE EXPANSIVE-EQUALITY APPROACH TO CONTRACTUAL
GOOD FAITH: SCHUSTER V. DERoCiLi
The Supreme Court of Delaware recently decided a case that il-
lustrates how an expansive equality approach might function in prac-
tice. In Schuster v. Derocili, the plaintiff alleged that her employer
breached its implied duty of good faith by discriminating against her
on the basis of gender.3 93 Schuster serves as a solid model for an ex-
pansive equality approach because the court's reasoning demonstrates
a commitment to the eradication of discrimination against cognizable
identity groups.
The plaintiff, Linda Schuster, was hired by defendant Compli-
ance Environmental Inc. as a temporary administrative assistant in
September 1997. 394 About a month later, she became a full-time em-
ployee of Compliance under a written employment contract specify-
ing that the employment relationship was at-will.395 Schuster worked
primarily for defendant Derocili, "the president and controlling share-
holder of Compliance. 3 96 Shortly thereafter, Derocili allegedly be-
gan to engage in inappropriate sexual conduct directed at Schuster,
including both sexual comments and physical advances. 397 Schuster
contended that she repeatedly rejected Derocili's advances.3 98 She
complained of this sexual conduct to two coworkers, and, upon coun-
sel of a religious advisor, began recording Derocili's conduct in ajour-
nal and rejecting his advances more vigorously.3 99
In December 1998, Derocili terminated Schuster, citing substan-
dard job performance, even though she had received several pay
raises and performance-based bonuses from Compliance, including
one performance-based bonus only a week prior to her termina-
tion.400 Believing that she was actually terminated for refusing Der-
ocili's advances, Schuster filed a complaint with the Delaware
Department of Labor.4° 1 She also filed a lawsuit in state court alleging
breach of contract based on violation of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.4°12 The trial court granted summary judgment
to Derocili on the breach of contract claim, holding that, because Del-
aware's employment discrimination statute provided an "elaborate
393 775 A.2d 1029, 1031-32 (Del. 2001).











statutory remedy" for sexual harassment, Delaware did not recognize
a common law claim for sex discrimination. 4113 However, the Depart-
ment of Labor had already dismissed Schuster's complaint under the
Delaware antidiscrimination statute.
40 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed two impor-
tant questions relevant to this Article's discussion. The court first ex-
amined whether "there exists a common law cause of action for sexual
harassment based upon a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will employment doctrine in
cases in which the termination is alleged to have violated a recog-
nized, legally cognizable public policy exception to at-will employ-
ment.' '4° 5  It then turned to whether the Delaware legislature
"intended... Delaware's Discrimination in Employment Statute [ I] to
be the sole remedy for a claim of sexual harassment by a terminated
employee.
40 6
The Schuster court held that a common law good faith claim is
valid under such circumstances and that Delaware's employment dis-
crimination statute does not provide an exclusive remedy, distinguish-
ing the many cases upon which the lower court had relied.407 The
lower court had relied on Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A.40 8 and
Drainer v. O'Donnell, 4°19 which, read together, arguably supported the
position that Delaware's antidiscrimination statute precluded
Schuster's common law claim.4 10 Ayres, a case in which the plaintiff
brought a breach of good faith claim in state court after his federal
statutory discrimination claims were dismissed, in turn relied on an-
other Delaware case, Finch v. Hercules Inc.
4 11
In Finch, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware pre-
dicted that the Delaware Supreme Court would not recognize a com-
mon law public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine
because the legislature had enacted "an elaborate statutory scheme
addressing the same public policy concerns. '4 12 The Schuster court
noted, however, that it had decided Merrill v. Crothall-American, in
which it recognized for the first time the good faith exception to the
at-will employment doctrine, in the same year that Finch was de-
403 Id. at 1032-33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
404 Id. at 1032.
405 Id.
406 Id,
407 See id. at 1032-40.
408 No. 96C-07-258-WTQ 1996 WL 769331 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996).
409 No. 94C-08-062, 1995 WL 338700 (Del. Super. Ct. July 28, 1995).
410 See Schuster, 775 A.2d at 1034.
411 809, F. Supp. 309 (D. Del. 1992); see Ayres, 1996 WL 769331, at *12.
412 Fiich, 809 F. Supp. at 312.
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cided.4 13 Moreover, in 1996 the court set forth in E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Pressman Delaware's categorical approach to the doc-
trine of good faith, which included a category for violations of public
policy.
41 4
In Drainer, the court similarly dismissed the plaintiffs common
law sexual harassment claim because Delaware had not recognized a
common law cause of action for employment discrimination, and sug-
gested that the Delaware statute provided an exclusive remedy.
415
The Drainer court, however, had relied on Wright v. ICIAmericas Inc.,
4 16
which involved an alleged violation of a specific provision of the Dela-
ware statute and a common law claim based only on that violation.
41 7
The Schuster court distinguished Drainer and Wright, noting that
Schuster had not asserted a claim arising directly from any specific
provision of the Delaware statute:
Schuster . . . asserts a common law claim for a breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing derived from her con-
tract of employment. Therefore we do not decide that a plaintiff may
assert a private cause of action for employment discrimination
based on sexual harassment on the theory that the Delaware legisla-
ture "intended [such] remedies" under [a particular statutory provi-
sion]. We do today, for the first time, decide that a person may assert
a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith based upon
a termination alleged to have resulted from a refusal to condone sexual ad-
vances. This private cause of action flows directly from Delaware's clear and
firmly rooted public policy to deter, prevent and punish sexual harassment in
the workplace.
418
Thus, the Schuster court synthesized the public policy and good faith
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Next, addressing the preclusion issue, the court noted that the
Delaware statute did not by its language proscribe related common
law claims:
While this Court will not "engraft upon a statute language which has
been clearly excluded therefrom by the Legislature," because of the
insidious nature of sexual harassment in the workplace, we conclude that
the General Assembly intended to combat sexual harassment in an ex-
pansive rather than restrictive scheme. The statute in question does not
413 Schuster, 775 A.2d at 1035 (citing Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96 (Del.
1992)).
414 Id. (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 441-44 (Del.
1996)).
415 See Drainer v. O'Donnell, No. 94G-08-062, 1995 WL 338700, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.
1995).
416 See id. (citing Wright v. ICI Americas Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1083, 1091 (D. Del. 1993)).
417 See Wright, 813 F. Supp. at 1090-94.




explicitly state that the remedies contained within it are exclusive to
all others, therefore, it is entirely consistent with the General Assem-
bly's intention to promote civilized conduct in the workplace to allow pri-
vate causes of action for breach of contract based upon termination solely
caused by a failure to respond to unwanted sexual advances by an
employer.
4 19
Although the court employed a conventional interpretive approach in
its analysis, it made clear that its reasoning and decision were consis-
tent with the legislative intent and with community standards.
42 0
Derocili and Compliance also argued that Schuster had failed to
satisfy the two-prong test for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing under the public policy category. 42 1 This two-pronged
test required, first, that Schuster "assert a public interest recognized
by some legislative, administrative or judicial authority" and, second,
that she "occupy a position with responsibility for advancing or sus-
taining that particular interest."422 The first prong was not at issue in
the case. 423 Schuster's argument regarding the second prong, how-
ever, was particularly noteworthy. The court stated:
Schuster contends that because she was as [sic] an employee to
whom Derocili allegedly made sexual advances, she necessarily occu-
pied a position with responsibility for advancing public policy condemning
that conduct. She argues that if in fact the statutory remedy is not
exclusive, and there exists a private cause of action in contract, then
if she cannot assert the public policy designed to protect her by
asserting that common law cause of action, it would be legally impos-
sible for any person similarly situated to enforce the public policy excep-
tion asserted here. The common law private cause of action would
be meaningless.
42 4
The court agreed with Schuster's reasoning and reemphasized the sig-
nificance of its holding as an effort to combat sexual harassment in
the workplace.
Shuster [sic] is an alleged victim directly injured by the alleged pub-
lic policy breach. Accordingly, she has standing.
* . ' Combating sexual harassment in the workplace ...has
nothing to do with deterring or thwarting a company from pursuing
its legitimate business goals.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is a systemic social problem
that involves a personal assault on the recipient. Preventing it is of immense
social value, and combating it promotes the public policy of this State. As
419 Id. at 1037-38 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
420 See id.
421 See id. at 1038.
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 1038-39 (emphasis added).
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such, the unfortunate recipient of unwelcomed sexual advances
holds a position of responsibility contemplated by the public policy
exception.
4 25
Schuster is remarkable because it demonstrates a nuanced under-
standing of the entrenchment of sexual subordination in the work-
place. Moreover, this understanding applies by analogy to cases
involving other forms of subordination based on cognizable identity
groups. Three of the Schuster court's conclusions are particularly help-
ful in illustrating the mechanics of an expansive equality approach to
good faith.
First, as discussed above, the Schuster court acknowledged explic-
itly the interconnection between the public policy and good faith ex-
ceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. Although Delaware has
recognized this interconnection for some tithe,4 2 6 courts in other ju-
risdictions have often ignored or rejected it. 4 27 Moreover, the court
refused to reason around the contractual nature of Schuster's claim by
recasting it as a tortious breach claim, noting that "Schuster ... asserts
a common law claim for a breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing derived from her contract of employment."42 8 The court
expressed no need to further justify Schuster's good faith claim on
economic terms, as other courts have, presumably because the court
understood that parties to a contract are entitled to receive the bene-
fits flowing from the terms of the contract in a manner that conforms
with "community standards of fairness, decency or reasonableness." 429
After all, if courts used the duty of good faith exclusively as a device to
ensure adherence to contract terms, the doctrine of good faith would
merely duplicate the standard breach of contract claim. In other
words, by infusing its application of the doctrine of good faith with
notions of equality, the Schuster court breathed life back into the doc-
trine of good faith.
Second, in holding that the Delaware antidiscrimination statute
did not preclude Schuster's contractual good faith claims, the court
demonstrated both its ability to deconstruct the lower court's analysis
and statutory interpretation, and a profound understanding of the
pervasive, systemic nature of sexual subordination. Although the
court recognized that conditions of sexual subordination may be alle-
425 Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
426 See, e.g., Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 400 (Del. 2000) (recognizing termination
that violates public policy as a form of bad faith termination); E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 441-44 (Del. 1996) (same).
427 See, e.g., Manuel v. Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F. Supp. 45, 50-51 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (rea-
soning that, in the at-will employment context, the good faith exception is distinct from
the public policy exception); supra Part IV.B.3.
428 Schuster, 775 A.2d at 1036 (emphasis added).
429 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
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viated in part by antidiscrimination laws, it ultimately refused to limit
the struggle against inequality to that corner of the law.
Third, the court's approach is particularly valuable because it
provided Schuster a meaningful legal tool to combat sexual subordi-
nation in the workplace, beyond the perpetrator-centered antidis-
crimination framework that had already failed her. Moreover,
because courts have used this tool-the implied obligation of good
faith-as a device for approximating the conditions of a perfect con-
tracting environment, the Schuster court effectively incorporated a
commitment to equality into its conception of the perfect contracting
environment.
Few courts since Schuster have addressed squarely the viability of
good faith claims under Delaware's construction of the at-will employ-
ment doctrine. 4 11 In Schatzman v. Martin Newark Dealership, Inc., the
plaintiff, a White male, sued his former employer, alleging retaliatory
termination after he reported a coworker for using racially derogatory
language.43' In addition to his federal civil rights claims, the plaintiff
claimed that his employer had breached the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing under Delaware law.432 The defendant dealership ar-
gued that the state antidiscrimination statute was an exclusive remedy
that barred the plaintiff's common law good faith claim. 433 Although
the court acknowledged the support in the lower courts for defen-
dant's argument,43 4 it then turned to Schuster, stating that:
[T]he Delaware Supreme Court recently held as a matter of first
impression that a plaintiff can maintain a common law claim for
breach of the Covenant due to discriminatory conduct, such as sex-
ual harassment, despite the fact that said conduct is prohibited by
both state and federal law. The Court finds this reasoning to be
equally applicable to the instant circumstances, which involves [sic]
retaliatory conduct against an employee who reported racially dis-
criminatory conduct to his superiors. Therefore, the Court con-
430 In Holland v. larif 794 A.2d 1254, 1258 & nn.6 & 7 (Del. Ch. 2002), the Delaware
Chancery Court discussed briefly whether the Delaware antidiscrimination statute created
a private right of action. The court noted that:
[C]ourts interpreting the Act have held that it creates no private right of
action independent of the administrative procedures set forth in the Act
itself. Other decisions have rejected common law claims premised on dis-
crimination prohibited by the Act, reasoning that the Act created a statu-
tory remedy in derogation of the common law employment-at-will doctrine,
and that complainants are stuck with the relief provided for them expressly
by the Act.
Id. at 1258 (footnotes omitted). Curiously, the Chancery Court cited decisions of the Dela-
ware lower courts and federal district court in support of its observation, despite its explicit
recognition of the Supreme Court of Delaware's contrary decision in Schuster. See id.
431 158 F. Supp. 2d 392, 397 (D. Del. 2001).
432 Id.




cludes that Plaintiff's breach of Covenant claim falls within the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
4 35
Thus, Schatzman used the Schuster decision to sustain a claim based on
a White plaintiffs refusal to tolerate racially pejorative remarks in the
workplace.
The court in Reed v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., on the other hand,
failed to acknowledge Schuster, and accordingly refused to recognize
the plaintiff's breach of good faith claim. 43 6 In Reed, the plaintiff
brought Title VII claims for "reverse" discrimination and common law
breach of good faith claims against his former employer. 43 7 Although
Reed may have reached the correct outcome, the court incorrectly ana-
lyzed Reed's good faith claim. Reed misstated the Delaware's Supreme
Court's holding in Lord v. Souder.4 38 Specifically, the Reed court stated
that one of the good faith exceptions to the at-will doctrine is "where
the termination violates public policy and no other remedial scheme
exists."' 4- 9 However, neither Lord nor E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Pressman incorporated the alternate remedies doctrine into the cate-
gorical good faith exceptions. 440 The Reed court thus bypassed an op-
portunity to discuss the nature of racial subordination and Reed's
attempt to misappropriate the rhetoric of civil rights jurisprudence.
Certainly the court could have reached the same conclusion in a more
nuanced manner had it directly addressed Reed's good faith claim.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that courts should use the doctrine of
good faith in contract law to prohibit the improper use of racial
prejudice in contract formation and performance and, moreover,
should recognize good faith as a device for eliminating racial subordi-
nation that can function beyond the scope of conventional civil rights
discourse. Although civil rights laws provide important remedies to
victims of discrimination, this Article has argued that the elimination
of racial subordination cannot remain the exclusive domain of civil
rights law, and that other substantive areas of law should and can in-
corporate expansive equality principles to achieve that end. For ex-
ample, this Article has demonstrated how the implied obligation of
good faith in contract law, applied in the at-will employment context,
can employ expansive equality principles to provide alternate reme-
435 Id. (citation omitted).
436 See 174 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191-92 (D. Del. 2001).
437 Id. at 178, 184.
438 See 748 A.2d 393, 400 (Del. 2000); supra note. 426 and accompanying text.
439 See 174 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (emphasis added) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442-44 (Del. 1996)).
440 See Lord, 748 A.2d at 400; Pressman, 679 A.2d at 441-44.
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dies to at-will employees who may not be able to obtain civil rights
remedies because of the onerous burdens they must satisfy in order to
prevail on their civil rights claims.
Although the courts have used the doctrine of good faith largely
to achieve economically efficient outcomes, courts need not limit the
doctrine's use in that way. Rather, courts can use the doctrine of
good faith to provide just outcomes to victims of racial subordination
on those occasions in which, from the victim's perspective, civil rights
laws fail to do so. By screening the doctrine of good faith through the
lenses of critical race and law and market economy theories, this Arti-
cle has further argued that using the doctrine of good faith in this way
is consistent not only with the equitable principles embodied by the
doctrine, but also with the contract goals of protecting the parties'
bargain, wealth formation, and the facilitation of exchange
transactions.
